Population Council

Knowledge Commons

1999

Unfulfilled Promises: Women's Rights in Egypt
Nemat Guenena
Nadia Wassef

Follow this and additional works at: https://knowledgecommons.popcouncil.org/departments_sbsr-pgy

How does access to this work benefit you? Let us know!
Recommended Citation
Guenena, Nemat and Nadia Wassef. 1999. "Unfulfilled Promises: Women's Rights in Egypt." Cairo:
Population Council.

This Monograph is brought to you for free and open access by the Population Council.

Unfulfilled Promises:
Women’s Rights

Nemat Guenena and Nadia Wassef*

i

ii

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The authors would like to thank all those who contributed to the production of this monograph in
its final shape. Asef Bayat, Huda Elsadda, Barbara Ibrahim, Mounir Neamatalla, Cynthia Nelson,
Shahnaz Rouse, Aida Seif al-Dawla, and Hania Sholkamy were our first readers; we thank them
for the time they took in reading the first draft of this work and providing us with constructive
comments. We would also like to express our heartfelt thanks to Leila Hessini for her role as both
a supportive friend and an astute reader. Thanks are also owed to Barbara Ibrahim and Moushira
El-Geziri from the Population Council for their support and patience. This monograph would not
have come out in its final shape without their support, patience, and advice. We are very grateful
to Jan Amin for her thoughtful suggestions. We are also greatly indebted to Susan Lee for seeing
us through the last stage of the project.
We would also like to express our gratitude to Huda Lutfi for offering one of her paintings as a
cover for this monograph. We are also indebted to the New Woman Research Center for permitting us to select some photographs from their photo archive for this publication, and to the organizations who gave us their posters. Finally, we owe a great debt to the individuals who were
interviewed and shared insights about their organizations with us, and who offered us their
unconditional support. Ultimately, we hope that this work will benefit NGOs and activists and
will make a contribution to the literature on womenÕs issues in Egypt.

iii

iv

ABOUT THE AUTHORS

Nemat Guenena is director of the Socioeconomic Research Unit at Environmental Quality
International (EQI) and associate researcher at the Ibn Khaldoun Center for Development Studies.
Over the years she has been involved in research on developmental issues and social movements,
with special emphasis on Islamic movements in Egypt.
Nadia Wassef is an independent researcher on gender issues. She is a member of several nongovernmental organizations (NGOs): the New Woman Research Centre, the Female Genital
Mutilation (FGM) Task Force, and the Women and Memory Forum. She has done research on the
history of womenÕs movements in Egypt and FGM from a variety of angles. She is currently
involved in a study on constructions of masculinities in the Arab world.

v

vi

PREFACE

This is a century marked by tremendous change in womenÕs place in society. In Egypt, moves to
integrate women more fully into all aspects of public life have been protracted and often accompanied by controversy. Yet, surprisingly little attention has been given to the public discourse around
gender and womenÕs place in society. As a result, sterotypes abound. Simplistic dichotomies
between the forces advocating religious conservatism versus those championing secular liberalism, for example, mask a more complex reality. The authors of this monograph argue that major
political forces today have appropriated the ÒwomanÓ issue as a basis for building popular legitimacy. They trace the origins and development of these trends and speculate on some of the important consequences for Egyptian womenÕs lives.
The genesis of this project was a dialogue among women from many African countries over the
nature of Òwomen in crisisÓ. North African women expressed the view that the situation in their
part of the continent was sometimes overlooked because it rarely took the dramatic form of wars
or natural disasters. Nonetheless, women in those societies felt an encroachment on their public
ÔspaceÕ and a sense of building tension around the politics of gender.
In 1997, a group of scholars affiliated with the Population Council regional office in Cairo
decided to undertake studies on the nature of these public struggles. They ultimately selected
Algeria and Egypt as two important cases for fuller analysis. From the beginning, an effort was
made to include multiple perspectives and disciplines. Leila Hesseini, an anthropologist, was the
principal author of two monographs on the sitation in Algeria. She was assisted by several women
in Algeria who, for reasons of security, requested anonymity.
In Egypt, the team was made up of Nemat Guenena, a sociologist who writes on Islamic movments, and Nadia Wassef, a writer/ activist whose work has focused on feminism and gender
issues. In the volume they jointly produced here, each had a unique perspective and responsibility.
Nemat Guenena developed a section on the recent history of religious and political discourse. She
also reviews womenÕs contemporary status in Egypt, providing examples of how the public discourse impacts womenÕs concerns and opportunities. Nadia Wassef developed sections dealing
with the context of feminism and activism in Egypt. She examines the historical struggle for womenÕs
rights, uncovering patterns of continuity and change. Nadia also looks at local womenÕs rights organizations and the strategies of resistance they promote.
The monograph was developed ove a two-year period of intense research, debate, and revision.
We are grateful to a number of perceptive readers who contributed to sharpening the ideas presented here. It is the hope of the Population Council that this publication will stimulate further
dialogue over these issues in Egypt. As a momentous century for gender relations everywhere
comes to a close, it is an appropriate moment to reflect on the future of women and men in one of
the worldÕs oldest civilizations.
Barbara Ibrahim
Cairo, August, 1999
vii

viii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.

Introduction
A. Definitions
B. The Islamic Movement in Egypt

II.

A Century of Struggle
A. Forging a Feminist Consciousness
1. Aisha Al-Taymouriya: A Blocked Writer
2. Malak Hifni Nassef: A Seeker in the Desert
B. Redefinitions: The Private and Public Spheres
1. The Seclusion of the Harem
2. Segregation and Veiling
C. Moving Into the Public Sphere and its Repercussions
1. WomanÕs Words, WomanÕs Absence
2. Feminist Demands, Nationalist Deeds
3. Prison
D. Articulating Feminist Demands
1. Public Voice, Public Persona
E. Redefinitions of Women and the Family: Personal Status Law
1. Polygamy
2. Divorce and Custody
3. Bayt al-TaÕah
4. Minimum Marriage Age
F. Forging a Public Existence
1. Education
2. Work
3. The Vote

III.

Egyptian Women Today
A. Women and Education
B. Women and the Media
C. Women and Work
D. Women and Political Participation
E. Women and the Law
F. Women and Health

ix

IV.

The Public Discourse in Egypt
A. Women: Different But Equally Worthy
B. The Personal Status Law and the New Marriage Contract
C. Islamic Attire and the New Veil
D. The International Conference on Population and Development

V.

Strategies of Resistance
A. WomenÕs Organizations
1. Women and Memory Forum: Knowledge is Power
2. Nour: Arab WomenÕs Publishing House
3. Association for the Development and Empowerment of Women (ADEW): "Give
Me Credit for Being a Woman".
4. New Woman Research Centre: Markaz Dirassat al-MarÕah al-Gedida
5. Centre for Egyptian WomenÕs Legal Assistance: Markaz Qadaya al-MarÕah alMisriya
6. The Egyptian Female Genital Mutilation Task Force
B. Self-Esteem Project: ÒI am proud to be a woman!Ó
C. Planning Ahead
1. Capacity Building
2. Reaching Out
3. MenÕs Roles

VI. Conclusion
VII. Bibliography

x

I. INTRODUCTION

At the turn of the century, Egyptian feminists and womenÕs rights activists struggled for a more
equitable status in society. Today, there is almost no field into which Egyptian women have not
ventured, yet their status in society remains unequal to that of men. And while there are many factors that account for the prevailing gender gap, male-dominated institutions have continued to
relegate womenÕs concerns to a low priority, impeding their progress. In this monograph we contend that recent public discourse in Egypt is dominated by the conservative polemics of the
Islamists and that the state, in its attempt to contain the Islamists, has subordinated womenÕs
issues to its own concerns for security and legitimacy. Progress toward gender equity is compromised by the stateÕs ambivalent commitment to the cause of women and by the growing influence
of the Islamists. Renewed appeals urging women to retreat to the private sphere and the appearance of the Islamic attire (al-ziy al-Islami) reflect the blurring of boundaries between the ÔsecularÕ
and the Ôreligious.Õ We argue that this threatens to negate many of the gains acquired by Egyptian
women throughout the past century.
Before proceeding further, we will provide a brief review of the main concepts and terminology
used throughout this monograph. This is followed by a background on the history of the Islamic
movement in Egypt and a rich overview of Egyptian women in contemporary history. The present
condition of Egyptian women is then summarized as a prelude to illustrating, through an examination of the public discourse, how womenÕs issues have been and continue to be relegated to a
subordinate position for political expediency. Finally, the concluding chapter presents the strategies of resistance that a number of civil society organizations are adopting to create alternative discourses that give women their rightful positions in both the private and public spheres.
A. DEFINITIONS
Central to the discourse on gender is the concept of equity (takafuÕ).1 Advanced by scholars of
women in development (WID) in the 1970s and early 1980s, it meant equal opportunity for equal
contribution. The emphasis on women as agents of production within this view constituted a challenge to the sex role dichotomy that denied womenÕs instrumentality and therefore their due share
in the production process. This market-focused equation and the Western-led development model
upon which the WID argument was based came under attack on the basis that it ignored or devalued other considerations related to the social significance of biologically-derived activities, class
relations, and the international order. Marxist perspectives, while also found lacking because they
1
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have failed to adequately explain the dynamics of the interaction between genders, nevertheless
introduced class relations into their analysis of social reality. Accordingly, womenÕs marginalization was perceived as part of a broader system of inequalities created by capitalism. Building on
the contributions of both WID and Marxist scholars, a more balanced framework was formulated,
integrating gender interests with structural forces. Premising that gender relations determine how
individuals experience structural forces, the social relations approach draws attention to the complex, diverse, and often subtle underpinnings of gender inequity. 2
In this monograph, we contend that any pattern of relations or arrangements that subordinates
one genderÕs concerns to the interests of the other is to be considered unfair, especially if it causes
suffering or is likely to result in hardship for the subordinate gender. Furthermore, we argue that the
notions of biological distinctiveness and complementarity contained in the Islamic discourse(s) have
been used to justify discrimination against Egyptian women in the past; and that they are being used
increasingly to this end (refer to chapters II and III, A Century of Struggle and Egyptian Women Today).
Public Discourse is a nebulous concept because it implies the existence of a unified ideology or
world view. While there are many discourses that exist at any given moment, each society has a
dominant ideological trend that permeates all aspects of life, bearing on social practices and
power relations. In Egypt, the past three decades have witnessed the growing influence of Islam as
a dominating ideology, challenging both the state and government institutions. This does not
mean, however, that the Islamic discourse(s) and the state discourse(s) are entirely or always pitted against each other. History reveals instances and issues of consensus. Moreover, Ôthe StateÕ is
not a static entity; its position vis à vis gender equity has shifted considerably over the past twenty
years. We argue, in fact, that there is considerable agreement among Islamists and state officials
around womenÕs status and related concerns. Finally, we maintain that political expediency has
usually been behind the instances when women have been treated on a more equal footing with
men. These issues will be discussed further in chapters II and IV, A Century of Struggle and The
Public Discourse in Egypt.
Islamic Activism is the engagement in behavior aimed at the reinstatement of Islamic rule,
including Islamic law (Sharia). The terms ÔIslamic activistsÕ or ÔIslamistsÕ have been used in the literature about EgyptÕs Islamic movements as umbrella terms describing the militant (violent) wing
of the Islamic movement. However, they have also been used to refer to non-violent advocates of
an Islamic order, thereby differentiating them from the more individually-oriented Suffis (mystics)
who practice their religion and rituals without attempting to effect societal change.3 In this monograph we use the terms Islamic activism and Islamism to refer generally to all proponents of an
Islamic social alternative in Egypt.
Bringing about Islamic rule is a goal to which all Islamists aspire, even while differing on the
modalities and mechanisms of implementation. While for the majority, the Islamic state and society is to be reinstated through advocacy and proselytization, for some it entails a violent struggle
against all detractors of the Islamic alternative. Moreover, Islamic activism entails a commitment
to bringing to practice the precepts, norms, and codes of behavior ascribed to Islam.4 Women and

2
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gender issues are at the core of these, defining the Islamic way of life, and distancing Islamic values and norms from the West or from Western-emulated ways. Consequently, women and their
bodies become the repository for tradition and Islamic virtue.
Secularism is used in this monograph for lack of a better term to refer to a trend opposing the
permeation of religion in all aspects of social and political life. The Egyptian Constitution combines both civil and religious law. Family and/or personal status issues are governed by Islamic
law (Sharia), while the law pertaining to civil matters is based on the French Napoleonic code.
Nevertheless, the overriding stipulation in the Constitution is that legislation should not contradict Sharia. Moreover, the Constitution specifies that Islam is the state religion.5 Consequently,
usage of the term secular to describe the Egyptian state is somewhat misleading, as it implies a
non-religious orientation that has never really existed. In the political culture of Egypt, there has
never been a separation between state and religion. In fact, the Egyptian state has always maintained a balance, albeit precarious at times, between the requirements of managing a modern
nation-state and its commitment to Islam.
Feminism and WomenÕs Rights Activism: Our understanding of ÔfeminismÕ (nasawiya) is based
on the Egyptian experience. It is Òan individual or collective awareness that women have been and
continue to be oppressed in diverse ways for diverse reasons.Ó6 Based upon that awareness,
Egyptian feminists and womenÕs rights activists work toward liberation from this oppression to
promote equitable relations between men and women. The overall goal is a society in which gender equity is a reality within the family, before the law, in political participation, in the work place,
in education, and in access to services. We define most of the women in the chapter entitled A
Century of Struggle as feminists, while those in Strategies of Resistance are referred to as ÔwomenÕs
rights activists.Õ This shift in terminology is justified in our view, because changes in contexts and
concepts have occurred that allow for this distinction. Ultimately the recognition of womenÕs
oppression is shared by feminists and activists, even if the reasons behind that oppression are perceived differently.
WomenÕs rights organizations and activists have gained some prominence in the last two
decades. The diversity in their approaches to womenÕs issues is reflected in the wide variety of
their activities. The chapter entitled Strategies of Resistance, labels them as activists in the sense that
they are, or have been, involved through both words and actions in the creation and articulation of
new discourses about women. They are fundamentally motivated by the desire to Òimprove
womenÕs legal, social, political, and economic awareness and positionÓ7 through various initiatives
and models of action.
Earlier feminists were mainly involved in, but not limited to, advocacy for womenÕs rights and
service provision. They started their activities from a mindset of social work and charity. Today
under the broad label of womenÕs rights activists, there are those who, like the early feminists,
focus on service provision and advocacy. In addition, however, there are those who work on consciousness-raising, grassroots mobilization, and scholarship. The reality of womenÕs lives has

5
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influenced their demands, which have increased over the decades. This changing reality has
brought a new language and new approaches to womenÕs issues-'development' being one of them.
These different directions do not have set boundaries dividing them. Under the development project there is room for interaction and the evolution of different models and approaches.
Early in this century, women involved in the Egyptian Feminist Union (EFU) and its offshoots
freely labeled themselves as Òfeminists.Ó After the 1952 revolution, and especially from the 1960s
onwards, certain negative connotations were attached to this identity. This has influenced
womenÕs rejection of the term today. Nadje al-Ali has recently undertaken research on womenÕs
activism in Egypt and explains the situation as follows:
My use of the term ÔwomenÕs activismÕ rather than ÔfeminismÕ is related to the fact that many of
the women I interviewed reject the label ÔfeministÕ for pragmatic and ideological reasons. The
English term ÔfeministÕ evokes antagonism and animosity, and sometimes even anxiety, among
a great number of women activists, who seem to have internalized the way feminists are being
portrayed in prevailing Egyptian discourses: men-hating, aggressive, possibly lesbian (but
most likely to be obsessed with sex), and certainly [W]esternized women. The resistance of
many Egyptian women to identifying themselves with feminism is not only related to its negative image in society, but is also linked to the conviction that it detracts from such Ôlarger issuesÕ
as imperialism, class struggle, and Zionism.8
The desire to highlight other Òlarger issuesÓ has sometimes meant coopting feministsÕ demands
under a larger umbrella and not always addressing them effectively. The chapter A Century of
Struggle contains examples of setbacks women have faced by being co-opted under nationalist, liberal progressive, and socialist discourses.
Feminism, both as a concept (focusing on women and their rights) and as a term, has been, and
continues to be, attacked as a Western import. Today womenÕs issues are seen as secondary to
larger issues, such as illiteracy and the alleviation of poverty, that are national problems. The
assumption made by some critics is that once these problems are solved, womenÕs status will
improve. WomenÕs rights activists focusing on womenÕs issues are thus on the margins. Some
human nights activists see the issue from the perspective of social justice and reject a purely
woman-oriented framework.
There is another dimension to this debate. In an article entitled ÒWestern Feminism Is Not What
We Need,Ó written prior to the 1995 United Nations Fourth World Conference on Women, Heba
Raouf, editor of the womenÕs page in the Islamist bi-weekly newspaper al-Shaab, states:
...we believe that participation in this conference [the UN Conference on Women] will only
deepen Egyptian feminismÕs financial and ideological dependence on the West. I do not
attempt to reconcile Islam and feminism. There cannot be a Muslim feminist, there is only
Islam. Hence, I am a Muslim woman who uses traditional Islamic methodology to find out
about womenÕs status within religion.9

8
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In the public discourse, feminism, or womenÕs rights activism, and religion are pitted against each
other with little room for negotiation or compromise. There are activists who do not want to operate within a religious framework as well as women who do so exclusively. The former are usually
respectful of religion but chose not to preach a vision of womenÕs emancipation through religion.
RaoufÕs point of view has its adherents, as does the less religiously-oriented feminist or
womenÕs rights activist position. We hesitate, however, to refer to ÔsecularÕ feminists or activists
for several reasons. First, in Egypt the word secular has come to have negative connotations. The
term goes beyond the idea of separating religion and the state and has become linked to apostasy,
making its use very misleading. Second, in reaching out to people and communities, feminists or
activists who would like to operate within a secular framework cannot do so because they would
be ignored. A secular approach is not widely shared or appreciated by the society at large. Thus if
one hopes to open a dialogue with people, identifying oneself as a secular feminist or activist is a
poor entry point. Terms have become highly politicized, causing people to reject some in favor of
others that are as yet less loaded and less controversial. The developmental framework offers new
labels, but even these are rapidly becoming politicized and problematic.
B. THE ISLAMIC MOVEMENT IN EGYPT
Activists who raise religious banners in their quest for power do not represent a new phenomenon
in contemporary Arab history. However, the potency of the religious alternative and its impact on
many spheres, including that of women, has varied over time. In the Arab world, the Islamic banner has been raised in defense of the community of believers (Umma) since the end of the first hijra
century (8th century). The rise and fall of the ruling dynasties in the Islamic world was tied to
reform-oriented and radical Islamic movements. The Abbassids and Fatimids early on, and the
Wahabis, the Mahdists, and the Sanussis in the 18th and 19th centuries, are good examples.
In Egypt, the role of religion as an idiom of discontent has been a constant, resulting in the
assassination of Prime Ministers Boutros Boutros Ghali in 1910, Ahmed Maher in 1944, Mahmoud
El-Nokrashy in 1949, and President Anwar Sadat in 1981. Islamic activism therefore, is not novel
to the Egyptian political scene, yet the situation of some of its current representatives is perceived
to be more extreme than that of their predecessors.
These groups are not new to the political scene, except, perhaps that their situation now is more
transparently desperate, and they have emerged onto a new political conjuncture of repeated failures of leaders and ideologies, and, crucially of the triumph of the Islamic revolution in Iran.10
The early roots of contemporary Islamic activism are associated with the names of Jamal Al-Din
Al-Afghani (1838-1897), Mohamed Abduh (1849-1905), and Rashid Reda (1865-1935). Faced with
the weakening and subsequent demise of the Ottoman Empire and the preeminence of European
powers, all three perceived Islam to have an energizing potential that could restore strength and
vitality to the Umma if reason was reappropriated and consecrated to the reinterpretation and revitalization of Islamic heritage. Consequently, a proper understanding of IslamÕs underlying principles and ethos was necessary in order to discern the path toward progress. This process did not
entail wholesale rejection of the West, nor the blind emulation of foreign political, social, or legal
10
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systems. Rather it entailed a critical examination of Western sources of strength, namely science
and technology. Most importantly, these early Islamists perceived Sharia to be at the core of Islamic
civilizational identity. In their quest for progress, they perceived the challenge faced by the Umma
as embodied in a renewed interpretation of Islamic law to suit the realities of modernity. It is clear
that the turn-of-the-century proponents of an Islamic alternative were intellectuals and reformers
who perceived rapid or revolutionary change as unwise and counterproductive. Emphasizing the
gradualist yet progressive nature of these earlier Islamists, Halpern points out that the dilemma of
Muslims in the Arab world after the deaths of Al-Afghani, Abduh, and Reda, became that of
choosing among the conservatism, extremism, or radicalism of their successors.11
The Muslim Brothers association, founded by Hassan El-Banna in 1928, took the concept of the
Islamic alternative beyond the realm of an intellectual endeavor to that of organized politics and
popular agitation.12 While Al-Afghani, Abduh, and Reda strove to deal with the intellectual challenges posed by modernism, El-BannaÕs message was a populist one. He called for a return to
Islam as a unifying force that would enable Egyptians, Arabs, and Muslims all over the world to
fight colonialism. Consequently, it is reported that by the mid-1940s, El-BannaÕs followers numbered approximately one million individuals recruited from all over Egypt.
The period following the 1952 revolution was characterized by tension between the regime and
the Brothers, who rejected an invitation to participate in the government. Moreover, their discourse became more rigid. Iterating their demands for the imposition of the veil (hijab) and for closure of nightclubs, theaters and cinemas, the Muslim Brothers argued that such measures would
prevent the infiltration of Western ideas into Egyptian society.13
The Muslim BrotherÕs association was banned in 1954 after a failed attempt on President Gamal
Abdel NasserÕs life unleashed the wrath of the regime. Many of its leaders and cadres were arrested, some were executed, while others managed to flee the country seeking refuge in a number of
Arab and Western countries. Only after President Sadat came to power in 1970 was the association
reinstated; its leaders were released and exiled members were encouraged to return to Egypt. The
reconciliation included restoring jobs to many of the returnees as well as financial compensation.14
Throughout almost three-quarters of a century, the Muslim Brothers stood at different junctures
in relation to the government: coalescing with it at times and opposing it at others. While national
liberation and political independence were causes that inevitably brought the association and the
state together, any attempt by the state at social or legal reform was met with opposition, especially if it fell within the realm of Sharia. The opposition to Decree 44 of 1979 amending the Personal
Status Law of 1929 is a case in point. Opposition to what was referred to as ÒJihanÕs lawÓ (named
for its sponsor and ardent supporter First Lady Jihan Sadat) was most vehement among the
Islamists, both establishment and opposition. They perceived Mrs. SadatÕs attempts to reform the
Personal Status Law as the ultimate proof of a conspiracy against Sharia. Adding to the intensity of
their opposition was the fact that the decree was passed during the summer recess of Parliament,
thereby casting doubt on its constitutionality. In fact, the Decree was declared unconstitutional in
1985 by EgyptÕs Higher Constitutional Court. Law 100 of 1985, which subsequently replaced it,
did not add much to the 1929 Personal Status Law. The minor changes that were introduced did
not come close to those secured by Decree 44, nor did they reflect the efforts toward greater equity
11
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exerted by Egyptian women throughout the century (refer to chapters II and IV, A Century of
Struggle and The Public Discourse in Egypt).
The position of the Muslim Brothers has been adopted and continues to be so by representatives of the religious establishment and other conservative elements in society, thereby reflecting
the influence they have in shaping the content and structure of the mainstream Islamic discourse.15
The length of the movementÕs duration and its resistance in the face of repression have earned it a
measure of respect that its militant offshoots still lack. The Muslim BrothersÕ violent tendency in
the 1940s and 1950s is largely overlooked by most Egyptians; that particular aspect of the movementÕs history is seen as being part of the resistance against the British and other imperialist
forces. The associationÕs initial claim of peaceful advocacy, which it has chosen to reaffirm since
the early 1970s, is the aspect most remembered by people. Also, in comparison with other groups,
the Muslim Brothers are perceived as rational and moderate. This allows them to provide many of
the so-called traditionalists, as well as the general lay public of Muslims, with a frame of reference
for the Islamic order.
Following EgyptÕs defeat in the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, disillusionment with the performance of
NasserÕs regime set in. A wave of religiosity swept through Egypt, encompassing both Muslims
and Christians. Claims that the Virgin Mary had appeared above the Cathedral of Zeitoun came
alongside a widespread feeling that the defeat was the result of having abandoned faith in favor of
human-made ideas and belief systems. In the same vein, some have noted that the 1973 victory
was explained to have resulted from the return to religion.16 It was this general mood of religiosity,
coupled with state encouragement, that led to the emergence and growing influence of the Islamic
groups (Jamaat), and their proliferation first within and then beyond national universities. In his
fight against remnants of the Nasserist regime, President Sadat achieved noticeable headway by
allowing the Muslim Brothers to reissue their monthly publication El-DaÕwa (The Call), and by
giving the Islamists a free hand on university campuses. Furthermore, the involvement of
Mohamed Osman Ismail, a former governor of Assuit (an Egyptian governorate), has been noted
as proof of the stateÕs furtherance of its relationship with the Islamists. Acting as an intermediary
between the government and the Islamic groups, Mr. Ismail provided them with directives, as
well as financial support. 17
From the 1970s onward, the relationship between the regime and Islamists began to deteriorate.
The first confrontation between them occurred in 1974 when a group of cadets from the Military
Academy (MA) attempted a take-over of the academy. The event, which was aborted, was
planned as a precursor to a coup dÕétat, which the cadets perceived as necessary in order to reinstate Islamic rule. The MA incident was followed in 1977 by a confrontation with the group
known as Jamaat El-Muslimin, otherwise known as El-Takfir Wal-Hijra (Repentance and Holy
Flight).18 The deterioration of relations also encompassed the Jamaat. Weary of their influence, the
state began to curtail their activities and disallowed the wearing of female niqab, which had begun
15
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to appear on university campuses.19 The Muslim Brothers fared no better. By 1979, exasperated
with the brothers' repeated criticisms of SadatÕs domestic and foreign policy, the state retaliated by
banning the publication of El-DaÕwa.
In September 1981, indiscriminate arrests of members of the intelligentsia and opposition preceded President SadatÕs assassination in October of the same year by the group known as Jihad. Both the
arrests and the assassination exemplified the ambivalence characterizing the interaction between the
state and Islamists.20 As long as they confined their utterances to issues of morality and social practices, the Islamists were tolerated and even cultivated when necessary. However, criticisms levied at
the stateÕs performance were not well-received. On the other hand, the Islamists, especially those
associated with the establishment but also the Muslim Brothers, demonstrated over the years that as
long as Sharia remained untouched, they were capable and even willing to accommodate and legitimate state policies and directives. Talhami notes that in order to survive and maintain some degree
of autonomy, Al-Azhar University developed a dualistic response to the state. While seemingly obedient on the official level, Al-AzharÕs contributions to educational thought and practice contradicted
and even opposed the modernist premises of the state.21
The renewed vitality of Islam as an alternative to secular ideologies has been explained as due
to a number of economic, political, and social factors. Economically, the open-door policy (infitah)
of the 1970s was perceived as a threat to the middle class, the key strata in Egyptian society. The
rank and file of both militant and non-militant Islamic activists come from the middle class. They
are the government officials and professionals who lost the edge they had gained during the
socialist Nasser era to the new class of businessmen and entrepreneurs that began to emerge in the
mid-1970s. Conspicuous lifestyles and excessive consumerism appeared, contrasting with the low
key, largely unobtrusive ways of living that had prevailed throughout the 1950s and 1960s. More
importantly, the younger elements of the middle class felt they had been short-changed. Young
and educated in EgyptÕs most prestigious universities, they had all the attributes of a professional
elite, but none of the opportunities or rewards they had been led to expect. On the political front,
the rapprochement with the United States and the subsequent peace treaty with Israel were decried
by many in the middle class, who accused SadatÕs regime of having sold out to the enemy. The
souring of relations with most Arab countries and the loss of its leadership position in the Arab
world were perceived as too high a price to pay for the return of the Sinai.
As a result of emigration to the oil-rich Arab countries after the 1967 war, Egyptians were
exposed to new values and practices, many of which were absorbed into their lives upon returning to Egypt. Even the practice of Islam was affected by their stay in the more conservative Arab
countries.22 Consequently, much of the polemic of the Islamists, including issues related to
morality, the family, and gender relations, is derived from or based upon interpretations and
practices of Islam that are not the usual moderate ones for which Egyptians are renowned.
Today, Egypt is in the throes of an economic adjustment program. Its costs are high and its benefits have not yet trickled down to the middle and lower classes. Despite the social safety nets that
the government has instituted, poverty persists, aggravated by the governmentÕs removal of
19
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subsidies on food and other commodities. Moreover, remittances from migration to oil-rich countries have decreased and, due to the recent attacks on tourists, revenues from tourism have
become erratic. These tensions have resulted in an unprecedented rise of violence. Incidents of
rape, killing of spouses, and other crimes that were rare until recently, now appear in the press on
a daily basis, together with the casualties resulting from confrontations with Islamic militants.
Given that no alternative has emerged to replace it, Islam remains both as an ideal and an
idiom. It is a given that is expressed differently by different segments of society. While the majority of Egyptians do not condone violence, they have become more conservative both in outlook
and behavior. The upsurge of religiosity is not confined to one social stratum, yet it remains to a
large extent a middle class phenomenon.
Resistance to reforming Sharia should be understood in this context. Rigid interpretations of the
text and of historical precedents should also be analyzed in relation to a generalized conservative
mood that is not propitious to the restructuring of gender relations. Consequently, calls for
granting women a more equitable status in society are met with resistance from men, as well as
from many women.

9
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II. A CENTURY OF STRUGGLE

Throughout this century, feminists and womenÕs rights activists have coexisted with different
governments and different Islamisms. Their position is difficult due to the fact that Òwhile the
boundaries of Islam and the nation are indeterminate and their juxtapositions variable, the centrality of women in guaranteeing the integrity of both is not.Ó23 In their attempt to push their cause
forward, feminists and womenÕs rights activists adopted different ÔumbrellasÕ under which they
placed womenÕs issues. In the early decades of this century, Egyptian feminists affiliated themselves with the nationalist movement and reiterated a discourse of progressive nationalism: the
advancement of women would guarantee the nationÕs advancement. Feminism and womenÕs
rights activism have also appeared under other umbrellas, changing over time, liberal, socialist,
Islamist, and so on, with the only consistency coming from the fact that women often got shortchanged! As this section illustrates, compromises between governments and other factions are
often reached at the expense of women.
The history of the Egyptian womenÕs movement is more than a nostalgic journey into the past; it
is the account of a struggle that continues into the present. The patterns of continuity and change in
the Egyptian womenÕs movement make it impossible for us to ignore the past, or to discuss the present without a spirit of comparison. The agenda for womenÕs rights today not only includes unmet
demands from the 1920s, but has also been enlarged to encompass other issues that were not on
that agenda 75 years ago, such as: female genital mutilation, reproductive rights, violence against
women, and women-headed households. It is disturbing that some demands from the 1920s that
were considered mainstream (such as the abolition of polygamy) are not frequently discussed
today, perhaps because they seem to be too ambitious. Even when the Egyptian government signed
the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), it
had reservations on Article 16, among others, which deals with marital relations.
The first part of this section traces the awakening of a feminist consciousness in certain key
individuals at the end of the 19th century and the subsequent birth of a movement. The remainder
deals with the demands that women have made until the 1970s, both in the laws that govern their
lives and in their desire for education, employment, and the right to vote. This section shows how
far women have advanced in spite of the obstacles that have faced them, but also how far they
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need to go to complete the unfinished project of empowerment.
A. FORGING A FEMINIST CONSCIOUSNESS
ÒI hated my femininity because it deprived me of the pleasure of learning and
leading the active life I used to love.Ó24
The circumstances of womenÕs personal lives in turn-of-the-century Egypt engendered a feminist
consciousness, which eventually led to their social, economic, and political participation within
society. They contrasted their lives with the freedom and opportunities males enjoyed effortlessly.
Aisha Al-Taymouriya, Malak Hifni Nassef, Huda Shaarawi, Nabawiya Musa, Inji Aflatuun, and
Doria Shafik, key figures in the womenÕs movement in Egypt, documented these facets of their
lives in memoirs and other published and unpublished writings. Towards the end of the 19th
century, the Ôwoman questionÕ (qadiyat al-marÕah), or womenÕs roles in society, became a much
debated issue in the press, in pamphlets, and in books. Following are brief discussions of the contributions of Aisha Al-Taymouriya and Malak Hifni Nassef, who lived and worked prior to the
birth of a womenÕs movement, but whose thoughts and works were instrumental in its creation.
The contributions of the other women mentioned above are discussed in the context of womenÕs
demands throughout this century.
1. Aisha Al-Taymouriya: A Blocked Writer
Aisha Al-Taymouriya (1840-1902)25 was one of the first woman writers to express a feminist consciousness in her writings. Due to an enlightened father, she received an early education though it
was eventually cut short in deference to family and marital duties. After the death of her husband
however, Al-Taymouriya was able to continue her education and her poetry, which spoke to
women in the shared language of oppression and pain.26 In spite of the advancements that women
have made since then, Al-TaymouriyaÕs story is not confined to the previous century: Alifa Rifaat
(1930-1996), a gifted short story writer of the 1970s and 1980s, suffered a similar fate. During her
married life, in spite of her husbandÕs condemnation of her publishing activities, she continued
writing under a pseudonym and without the knowledge of her family. After her husbandÕs death
she published her work, and only then under an assumed name.27 Different centuries and different
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backgrounds separated these women; social restrictions united them.
2. Malak Hifni Nassef: A Seeker in the Desert
The generation following Aisha Al-Taymouriya
saw the rise of Malak Hifni Nassef (1886-1918), who
carried forth the banner of equality (musawah)-with
a difference. Malak, a writer and teacher, was one of
the first women to write in widely circulated newspapers, but only under the pen name of Bahithat alBadiya (Seeker in the Desert).28 After her marriage,
she discovered that she was a second-wife and that
her husband expected her to tutor his daughter by
his first wife.29 She was loyal to his wishes during
their 11 year marriage, which ended with her premature death. Malak was an advocate of womenÕs
rights, yet she believed that things needed to take
their natural course and should not be hurried. In
MALAK HIFNI NASSEF
response to the writings of Abdelhamid Hamdy
(one of the progressive men who championed
womenÕs liberation), she wrote an article entitled ÒAl-Hijab am Al-SufurÓ (ÒVeiling or UnveilingÓ),
in which she argued that society was not ready for unveiled women. She believed that the education of both men and women was a necessary prerequisite to taking the step to unveil.30
Malak influenced later feminists who looked to her for inspiration when caught between various currents. Her Òwritings reveal the tensions inherent in her status as a woman who, although
urban-reared, lived a rural existence; and as a nationally prominent author who, while Frencheducated, supported the conservation of religious and national values.Ó31 MalakÕs writings during
that period enable us to challenge the commonly held notion that the Ôwoman questionÕ was a
debate authored by ÔliberalÕ males.32 As her presence and views attest, women were a strong force
within that debate and were capable of articulating themselves. In 1919, the year following
MalakÕs death, Egyptian feminists channeled their consciousness toward creating a more public
movement that attempted to improve womenÕs lives.
B. REDEFINITIONS: THE PRIVATE AND PUBLIC SPHERES
1. The Seclusion of the Harem: ÒI have suffered in this cave of isolation.Ó33
The early 1900s were still permeated by the harem system in which urban women from the middle
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and upper classes were segregated in their homes, went out infrequently, and only if properly
accompanied.34 Qasim Amin (1863-1908)35 pointed to this seclusion as an injustice in his tracts
dealing with the liberation of women. Lower class and rural women had more Ôfreedom,Õ since
their economic situation obliged them to work.
By 1908 even upper class women had begun to emerge from their seclusion: they came out of
their homes to work in charitable institutions, like Mubarrat Mohamed Ali, which furnished people
with the services of clinics, hospitals, and dispensaries.36 While these institutions provided services
to both women and men, men were not involved in the administration. In 1908 a series of lectures
at Fouad I University was organized by Huda Shaarawi (1879-1947) and other women from the
upper echelons of society. They met on Fridays (a holiday, ensuring that the university would be
empty) to hear lectures and to discuss women-related issues.37 This was the first recorded effort
whereby women carved out a public space for themselves outside the home and within a maledominated institution. Even in a Ôsegregated settingÕ male students vehemently opposed the presence of women on the campus. They demonstrated to have the section closed down, prevented
women from entering, and made death threats. The womenÕs section was closed in 1912 or 1913.38
In both these examples, women emerged from their seclusion but still maintained the segregation
of the sexes: their charity work did not involve men directly nor did they frequent the university
when men were on the premises.
2. Segregation and Veiling
Gender segregation was an integral part of social etiquette and class structure. It could not be
transgressed by either sex; the practice of men reading womenÕs words to a male audience testifies
to this rigidity. Several incidents are reported in which women sat behind a screen while a male
proxy read their speeches.39 The religious authorities were a prominent factor in adamantly maintaining segregation; however, it was not always for the purposes of morality-economic motives
also came into play. For example, the religious authorities were hesitant to allow women to teach
in schools. In theory allowing this would continue segregation since women could teach female
students, but it would also have meant that male teachersÕ jobs would be jeopardized and competition would increase.40 This did not mean that religious institutions in Egypt were uniformly
against womenÕs demands. They supported them when it suited their purposes: feminists campaigning to end state-licensed prostitution in the 1930s were showered with praise from Al-Azhar
University for their social activism, good conscience, and the preservation of societyÕs morals!
The issues of veiling and segregation were inextricably bound. To veil or unveil was widely
debated in the Egyptian press in the first two decades of the twentieth century. The veil meant,
and still means, different things to people of various classes, ethnic origins, and religions. Earlier
this century the veil worn by Christian and Muslim elite was reminiscent of the Turkish culture of
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the Ottoman Empire. Rural women, however, worked unveiled, but with their hair covered for the
sake of practicality.41 For many of the progressive men championing female emancipation Òthe
womanÕs veil was a symbol of her relegation to the private sphere and of the appropriateness of
her invisibility and non-participation in public life.Ó42
Women metaphorically unveiled in the nineteenth century when they began to found journals
and contribute to the press, albeit under pseudonyms. These same journals published pictures of
women with accounts of their achievements. In 1923 Huda Shaarawi, one of the best known figures of the womenÕs movement and an ardent nationalist, and Ceza Nabarawi, ShaarawiÕs protŽgŽe, judged that society was ready. Upon their return from a conference in Europe, they unveiled
and descended onto the train station platform with their faces showing, but hair covered.43 Other
women followed their example. By shedding the veil they announced their entry into EgyptÕs
public life and the end of the harem systemÕs cloistering of women. No longer would women
remain on the periphery of society, exiled to the home and denied their right to create their future
and that of their country.
The practice of veiling decreased dramatically in towns and cities in the middle of this century.
Abandoning the veil was associated with becoming educated and participating in building the
post-revolutionary society. In recent decades, however, there has been a resurgence. This has been
explained by some as a solution to an increasing problem of harassment: Òwearing Islamic dress
may in fact be a feminist stance in a society that is quick to make life for the unveiled woman
insufferable.Ó44 This is not the case for all women, but definitely a factor for some. The veil, as it
has been adopted more recently, has different associations from the one worn earlier this centuryan issue taken up later in this monograph.
C. MOVING INTO THE PUBLIC SPHERE AND ITS REPERCUSSIONS
1. WomanÕs Words, WomanÕs Absence
In 1910 Malak Hifni Nassef presented her feminist and nationalist demands to the Egyptian
Nationalist Congress via a male proxy. Her absence was in accordance with the eraÕs traditional
values and Òillustrates the reality of segregation.Ó45 Her demands were aimed at reforming the
whole of society. On the feminist front, she demanded access for women to educational and professional opportunities, reforms in the Personal Status Law, and a renewal of the right of women
to pray in mosques, a space that had previously been open to them in Islam.46
On another front, womenÕs words were being heard in the community through their contributions to the mainstream press and womenÕs journals. These journals started in 1892 with the publication of Hind NawfalÕs monthly journal Al-Fatah (The Young Woman).47 By the 1920s, it is
estimated that there were more than thirty of these journals. The subjects covered varied from
household tips to militant articles demanding womenÕs rights and historical vignettes of womenÕs
past contributions to Egyptian history. This desire to assert the importance of women both in the
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past and the present added credence to the womenÕs movement. The heavy reliance upon ancient
Egyptian history served to authenticate and indigenize womenÕs needs and struggles while proving their contribution to history. Research organizations are again picking up the threads of their
ancestors in reasserting womenÕs public
roles and their active
participation
in
Egyptian history.

MEN AND WOMEN ON A CARRIAGE DURING THE 1919 RIOTS.
THE VEILED WOMAN RAISES THE EGYPTIAN FLAG

" History matters in the Middle East, and the history of women is being used by
scholar/activists to critique narratives favoured by conservative religious and political
groups and to challenge constructions of gender based upon those narratives. Research on
the history of women and the discourse of gender provides womenÕs advocacy groups with
the arguments they need to discredit the myths and misconceptions about Middle Eastern
women that prevent them from entering the public space. Because history in the Middle
East is so highly politicized, the point still needs to be made that women participated in
major historical events and that feminism is not a [W]estern import".48

2. Feminist Demands, Nationalist Deeds
In 1919, the year following Malak Hifni NassefÕs death, Egypt was in political turmoil and riots
broke out. Women of all classes and religions took to the streets: some in cars, others in veils.
Huda Shaarawi, described these scenes in her memoirs and highlighted the fact that when the
trouble started she was confined to her home, in the spirit of segregation.49 The special
correspondent of The London Times, Sir Valentine Chirol, described the scene:
In the stormy days of March and April 1919, they [the women] descended in large bodies into
the streets, those of the more respectable classes still in veils and shrouded in their loose black
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coats,
whilst the
courtesans
from
the
lowest
quarters of
the
city,
who
had
also caught
the contagion
[of
political
unrest],
disported
themselves
WOMEN MEETING AT HUDA SHAARAWI'S HOME TO PLAN THE BAYCOTT OF BRITISH GOODS (1924)
unveiled
and arrayed in less discreet garments. In every turbulent demonstration, women were well to
the front. They marched in processionÑsome on foot, some in carriages shouting for
ÒIndependenceÓ and ÒDown with the English,Ó and waving national banners.50

The first time women ignored the customs of segregation and went out in the streets alongside men
was in a moment of extreme violence and social upheaval. Sexual harassment became the most effective weapon against female demonstrators. The British Commandant of police described the scene:
The ladies found their way opposed by a formidable line of Egyptian conscript police, who had been
previously warned that they were not to use violence but... considerable license was given them by
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their officers to practice their ready peasant wit on the smart ladies who confronted them.51
Sexual harassment was exercised upon veiled, upper class women protesters as a form of control,
while physical violence was reserved for lower-class women, several of whom were killed.52
This event was a watershed in the history of Egyptian feminism. It marked upper and middle
class womenÕs entry into public life and the nationalist struggle. More importantly, women of different classes and religions were united by the same cause. They were in male territory participating in activities commonly dissociated from womenÕs Ônature.Õ The 1919 revolution also marked
the birth and union of the feminist movement with the nationalist one. These feminists and their
agenda were subsumed under the larger
nationalist umbrella. They had carved a new
and legitimate space for themselves. However,
with this new space came new threats...
3. Prison
...the political activity which had led me to prison
was the real and healthy sum of my life in the face of
an oppressive, hostile reality, which one must strive
to change.53
As long as women maintained the socially-constructed boundaries, their protected status was
guaranteed. With womenÕs newfound outspoken behaviour, however, came the threat and
use of prison as a tool to keep them in check.
Alexandra Avierino, who founded the
womenÕs magazine Anis al-Jalis (The Intimate
NABAWIYA MUSA
Companion) in 1898 in the cosmopolitan city of
Alexandria, was one of the first women to go to prison. She is described as having Òsought public
renown and a role in contemporary events.Ó54 In July 1924 she was arrested on the charge of being
involved in an assassination attempt on Prime Minister Saad Zaghloul:
But prosecutors found no incriminating evidence, and after questioning her for several days
brought no charges... They considered charging her with using her house for the purposes of
prostitution... again, officials found no evidence for their claim.55
Trying to discredit women by insinuating their involvement in sexual matters was a tactic later used
with other women, but it took different forms. In 1942, Nabawiya Musa (1886-1951) criticized the
government, specifically that of Nahhas Pasha, and was imprisoned as a result.56 In MusaÕs life-long
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struggle for her rights, she was well-acquainted with institutional harassment tactics. This time,
however, her cell mates were prostitutes. Linking the pioneer of womenÕs education, the respected
school teacher, the admired headmistress, and the first woman to get equal pay in a government job,
with Ôwomen of ill reputeÕ was an obvious strike at her morality. MusaÕs imprisonment was rare for
a woman of her status; however, by the middle of the century that had changed.
During the 1960s, women from the entire political spectrum were subject to imprisonment. Inji
Aflatuun (1924-87), an artist, political activist, and feminist, was imprisoned for her views. Latifa
Al-Zayat (1926-1996), a novelist, activist, and member of the communist student organization at
Cairo University, described her own experiences. She remembers being harassed by Muslim fundamentalist students who Òtried to defame my reputation-they called me a prostitute...Ó57 During
the 1960Õs and 1970s she was imprisoned by the government for her political views. The 1970s saw
even more women imprisoned for their political views. Islamist women were at the other end of
the political spectrum. In the 1960s mounting concern over the influence of the Muslim
Brotherhood reached a crescendo, especially after the assassination attempt on President Nasser in
1954. Zeinab Al-Ghazali (1917- ), the founder of the Muslim WomenÕs Association and a previous
renegade member of the Egyptian Feminist Union, was imprisoned in 1965 amidst Òa new round
of arrests of Brotherhood members.Ó58 She had survived the first round of arrests earlier in the
decade. Al-Ghazali was released six years later after having withstood torture, which she documented in her memoirs.59
According to these womenÕs accounts, their sexuality was used against them. This is a common
thread that transgresses the boundaries of time and political affiliation. Accusing Avierino of
using her home for prostitution; MusaÕs sojourn with prostitutes in jail; Al-ZayatÕs labeling as a
prostitute; and the physical violence Al-Ghazali experienced illustrate attempts to suppress
women by tarnishing or violating their sexuality through speech or action.
D. ARTICULATING FEMINIST DEMANDS
1. Public Voice, Public Persona
In the 1920s a group of women became a political force within the Egyptian nationalist struggle.
Huda Shaarawi was president of the Wafdist WomenÕs Central Committee, which operated closely
with the Wafd party. Once the Wafd gained power and a constitution was drafted, the women discovered that they had been left out and were not granted the rights they had been promised.
WomenÕs needs were subsumed by the larger nationalist cause and relegated to the bottom of the
groupÕs priorities. This short-lived alliance was based on a symbiotic relationship: women had
gained legitimacy through their alliance with the nationalist Wafd party, and the Wafd had used
the women to rally the people when the British imprisoned or exiled party leaders. However, after
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the Wafd party reneged on its promises, women needed a new forum: in 1923 the Egyptian
Feminist Union (EFU) was created.
The EFU was made up of Coptic and Muslim women from the upper and upper middle classes.60
The EFUÕs demands were split into three sections: political (mainly nationalist), social, and feminist.
By placing feminist demands last, they decentered womenÕs rights and placed them within a nationalist framework-the advancement of women guarantees a nationÕs improvement.61 In light of the
alliance that existed between these women and the nationalist cause, they continued to utilize the
nationalist discourse to strengthen their position. Malak Hifni Nassef used this argument to advocate womenÕs education, as did Nabawiya Musa in defending womenÕs right to work.
Throughout the EFUÕs most active years (1923-1947), its members were treading a fine line
between government and religious forces-not wishing to antagonize either, and in the process, negotiating their at first peripheral existence. Therefore while the feminists did want change and reform,
they did not want to be too critical in matters touched by religion. This was problematic because:
the strong identification of cultural authenticity with Islam has meant that feminist discourse
could only legitimately proceed in two directions: either denying that Islamic practices are necessarily oppressive or asserting that oppressive practices are not necessarily Islamic.62
The feminist demands that the EFU made 75 years ago are still pertinent to the lives of women
today. Some progress has been made, but the various governmentsÕ lack of commitment to
womenÕs issues and their tendency to compromise on womenÕs issues, has threatened to undo
what women had previously achieved. The following is a discussion of the EFUÕs demands.
Except for a few concessions, the feminist agenda has not radically changed, but has expanded to
cover more ground.
E. REDEFINITIONS OF WOMEN AND THE FAMILY: PERSONAL STATUS LAW
When drafting laws earlier this century, a compromise was reached: secular law was used in civil,
commercial and penal codes, while the family and the governance of the personal lives of men
and women remained under Islamic law.63
As a result articles of personal status codes often conflict with the constitutions of Arab countries.
While the latter guarantee equal rights for all their citizens, the former extend privileges to men in
the family (in the areas of marriage, divorce, and child custody) which are denied to women.64
The family is often identified as a primary location of womenÕs oppression.65 Given that the
Personal Status Law Òorganizes the relationship of marriage through all its stages,Ó66 it has a
tremendous impact on gender and power hierarchies within the family. It was issued in 1925 as
Law 25, then amended in 1929. More recently changes have taken place in 1979 and in 1985. In
general, Òthe [P]ersonal [S]tatus [L]aws dealt with women as part of the regulation of the organi-
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zation of the family, not as individuals with their own separate or equal rights.Ó67 The following
section of the monograph traces the demands of the EFU regarding the Personal Status Law and
further attempts to modify it through to the 1970s. Throughout the 1920s, the governments in
power avoided eliciting any change in the laws so as not to upset the imbalance between the genders. This was in direct contrast to the changes taking place for women in the realms of education
and work. The entire mechanisms of society could alter but the patriarchal family unit was guarded from any such change.
1. Polygamy: ÒThe shade of a man is better than that of a wall.Ó68
When the EFU set forth an agenda in 1923, one of the most pressing issues necessitating reform
was the Personal Status Law, a form of discrimination that feminists experienced first-hand. Huda
Shaarawi and Malak Hifni Nassef both discovered their co-wife status after their marriages. EFU
women wanted to curtail the practice of polygamy because it threatened women and children in
its destruction of families. A manÕs right to marry up to four wives was used as an intimidation
tactic to keep a wife in check. ÒWomen feel constrained to be exemplary wives in every
respect...the introduction of a new wife into the household means a division of material resources
as well as of affection.Ó69 Earlier this century it was an extremely common practice: Umm
Kulthum, the legendary singer, remembers that: Òmy father never took another wife. This was not
common then in the rif (countryside); not even in our family itself, for I had three uncles and each
of them had married two or three times.Ó70
Earlier Imam Mohamed Abdu (1849-1905) had described in his memoirs the problems faced by
women and denounced polygamy altogether.71 In 1927 the EFUÕs amendments restricting
polygamy and the male right to divorce, based on the views of Mohamed Abdu, were presented
in draft form to the Cabinet and were approved. The amendments sought were not in contradiction to the spirit of Islamic teachings, yet King Fouad denied them his support.72 This situation
expresses the divisions within government and dismantles the idea that governments are monolithic entities. It also foreshadows subsequent incidents in which attempts at reform were aborted
at various levels of the decisionmaking process.
Even though the EFU met with no success in implementing reforms, attempts to elicit change
in the Personal Status Law continued. In 1972 and 1974, Aisha Rateb (the Minister of Social Affairs
at the time) attempted to elicit reforms dealing with divorce and polygamy. Her suggestions,
which were also grounded in Islam and its teachings, were again refused. The reaction to them
was more telling of the social atmosphere.
The 1974 proposal even elicited a protest march from the Al-Azhar community of Ôulama
[scholars] and students upon the PeopleÕs Assembly and President Sadat promised in a public
speech that no action on the proposal was presently contemplated by the Assembly.73
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Yet another proposal was put forward in May 1977 with no success. In Egypt polygamy is still the
legally and religiously sanctioned right of Muslim men. This is in direct conflict with the Egyptian
National Charter (1962), which claims that Òthe family is the first cell of society and therefore, in
the national interest, it must be afforded all means of protection.Ó74 WomenÕs needs and demands
were short-changed yet again. Even when a faction within the government attempts to institute
some reform, the remainder of the government will often give in to the more conservative strands
of public opinion. This normally happens regarding womenÕs issues, but with other policies the
government often enforces them regardless of public protest. Unfortunately, most of the compromises and concessions seem to take place in the domain of and at the expense of womenÕs rights.
2. Divorce and Custody: Ò...he was my husband and any time he wanted to do anything to me I
must let him and not fight him.Ó76
Divorce is the dissolution of the marriage contract. A manÕs right to divorce his wife without witnesses or recourse to a court, sanctioned in Sharia, was a source of concern to EFU women and victims of this law alike. Law 24 of 1920 claimed that if a husband was unable to support the wife or
if he suffered from an irreversible illness, a woman had grounds for divorce. However, divorce
still remained a male utterance in private and not a reality debated in a court of law.76
When these laws were being revised in 1929, the only advance EFU members succeeded in making was to insert the amendment that a man could not pronounce himself divorced from his wife if
it was in a moment of duress, and that a wife could ask for a divorce. These guaranteed nothing.
Women could be granted a divorce if they could prove that their current marital situation was in
some way harming (darar) them. Unfortunately the final judgement was left to male judges who
might or might not be sympathetic. Of course, the repercussions of divorce affect women from various classes in radically different ways. From the early decades of the century until today, the reality
is that alimony or compensation are rarely paid to the wife, who is left to fend for herself.
Custody, a motherÕs right to keep her children until they are of a certain age, was extended
from ages seven for boys and nine for girls in 1929 to ages ten and twelve respectively in 1979.77
However, in both cases the judge is allowed to exercise his discretion in extending the duration of
custody. Should the mother remarry, she loses custody of her children, while the father never loses
that right. Again the realities of this law affect women differently depending on socio-economic
factors: a wifeÕs recourse to the legal system is an expensive and time-consuming option, making
it virtually inaccessible to poor women. Moreover, even if there were gender-sensitive laws, the
general lack of legal literacy among women is an impediment to the attainment of their rights, as
are the biased attitudes of male judges.
3. Bayt al taÕah: ÒI had married, and so found myself living behind bars.Ó78
Bayt al-taÕah (house of obedience) is not derived from or related to the Quran [Islamic Holy Book]
or Sunna [the practice of the Prophet], yet it is law. The idea of bayt al-taÕah is inextricably linked to
76
77
78
79
80
81

Hatem, 1986: 27.
Hussein, 1985: 229-232.
Kamal, 1985: 304-316.
Zulfikar, n.d.: 24-25.
Chemais, 1987: 9.
Hill, 1979: 83.

22

a manÕs right to demand obedience of his wife. The origin of bayt al-taÕah is the belief that a wife
must remain in the conjugal home and obey her husband in exchange for his financial support.
Should she leave the conjugal home (hence disobeying her husband) then he has the right to order
her back, either to their home or to another that fulfils certain criteria. The criteria for this abode
are that it Òshould normally be a suitable healthy place for the family, duly equipped and furnished and not shared with other families.Ó79 It is advised by the law that neighbours should be
near enough Òto be able to hear the scream of the wife and therefore be witnesses on what takes
place between the married couple.Ó80 This stipulation offers a hint about the nature of the relationship between the spouses, especially when the husband forces his wife to return to him and obey
his commands against her will. Bayt al-taÕah has been used by men as a loophole to avoid alimony
payments to the wife: if the wife refuses to go to bayt al-taÕah then she becomes deviant (nashez)
and forfeits her right to alimony upon divorce.
The EFU campaigned for its abolition in the 1920s but was unsuccessful. There was an amendment to the bayt al-taÕah law on 13 February 1967: a Ministerial order was issued that prohibited
the use of the police to bring a woman back to the house.81 Attempts to abolish it have continued
through the decades to no avail. This situation is sanctioned by society, protected by legislation,
and apparently exempt from change because it is falsely ascribed to religion.
4. Minimum Marriage Age: ÒMy father was not punished for having married me off when I
was a legal minor.Ó82
Again, feministsÕ perceptions of womenÕs problems came from their own experiences. Huda
ShaarawiÕs marriage in her early teens to her cousin, a man much older than she, served as a
reminder of the negative implications of marriage at a young age. In the 1920Õs, the EFU petitioned the government to set a minimum marriage age. Parliament acquiesced and set the minimum marriage age for girls and boys at 16 and 18 respectively.83 Unfortunately, at least for girls,
this law is rarely enforced and falsification of the necessary documents is easily achieved.
Moreover, as usual, a law governing minimum marriage age affects segments of society differently. It is supportive for middle and upper class families who want to continue the education of their
daughters. The law also encourages the completion and attainment of school degrees for boys (at
age 18), whereas girlsÕ education can be curtailed earlier (at age 16), implying that it is of secondary importance. The dangers of early childbearing and the problems of access to health care
are exacerbated by this law.
F. FORGING A PUBLIC EXISTENCE
Reform within the family was not sufficient; women wanted access to a public life within society.
To realize equal rights and equal citizenship, women needed: an education, the right to work in
the profession of their choice, and the right to vote. Denied these rights and life options, they were
homebound within a domestic power hierarchy. This hierarchy was rarely favourable to them as
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they were always social dependents.
1. Education: ÒThe eyes are of little use if the mind be blind.Ó84
Education has been an area in which women have met with triumph. Precisely because education
is a powerful tool through which Òthe state reproduces the gender and social relations of production,Ó85 the EFU prioritized it on their agenda. This emphasis on education began within urban
areas and gradually spread to the rural areas. The history of education in Egypt displays an interweaving of religion, colonialism, modernity, and the government:
The legacy of the nineteenth century was to create a dichotomy of cultural outlook produced by
the introduction of a State school system modeled on European lines and the expansion of the
missionary and foreign community schools, superimposed on the religious Kuttab system... the
religious schools continued to provide a rudimentary education for the masses in the form of
the three Rs (reading, writing, and arithmetic), while the modern government schools provided
a secular European style education for the existing and aspiring elite.86
In 1873 the first state girlsÕ primary school was created, teaching its pupils religion, mathematics,
history, geography, and home economics. However, girls were not entitled to sit for a final
examination until 17 years later.87 Qasim AminÕs nationalist and ÔemancipatoryÕ discourse
propagated education because it enhanced women, but only in service to the nation to produce
better children, not to grant women greater life opportunities. Women themselves espoused this
discourse; some believed in it genuinely while others used it as a loophole to get what they
wanted:-an education. Enter Nabawiya Musa.
Nabawiya Musa was a pioneer of womenÕs education and many of the rights that Egyptian
women hold today in this field are largely due to her struggle.88 In 1906 Musa was the first woman
to receive a degree from the Sanniya School for Girls.89 Salama Musa, a famous writer and journalist, wrote in his autobiography:
...we witnessed Miss Nabawiya MusaÕs success as the first young woman who obtained her
secondary school certificate, though Dunlop [the British education adviser] had placed many
obstacles in her way.90
She later worked as a teacher, headmistress, and administrator, and was appointed inspector of
female education in 1924. In narrating her life, Musa makes links between womenÕs status,
discrimination, education, and work:
I filled out the application to sit for the baccalaureate examination and sent it in on time to the
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Ministry of Education. The men of the ministry went into an uproar over it...they thought it
preposterous...Mr. Dunlop came to me at the ÔAbbas School with my application in hand. He
gave it to me laughing...91
The day she went to sit for the examination, Musa remembers:
...My brother accompanied me...we would sit at the back of the tram not to attract the attention
of the male students but their talk poured over my head. Some of them vowed to beat the girl
student should she fail in the examination. And of course she would fail. She applied to sit for
the examination only to show her beauty and charms. They paid no attention to me because I
was not the person of their imagination...The girl sitting at the back of the tram was modest,
and no one would think for a moment that she could read.92
Musa entered and left the building from the back door to avoid the threat of violence that awaited
her. After passing the examination, she fought for a teaching post and received equal pay. This
was an exception in the field of education for a long time to come. In this defiant act she asserted
womenÕs right to education, work, and equal pay-as well as dealing a blow to the British
colonialist ethos.
Based on the 1924 Constitution, which stated Òthat obligatory free elementary education
extended also to girls,Ó93 the EFU demanded that the state create secondary schools for girls, teaching them the same curriculum that boys received. The Minister of Education, Ali Maher, consented to the EFUÕs request, and the Shubra Secondary School was opened in 1925, almost four
decades after the first boysÕ secondary school. In spite of this, in 1927, slightly more than 2 percent
of women were literate compared to just over 11 percent of men.94 It was only after independence
in 1929 that women obtained Secondary School certificates, 22 years after MusaÕs triumph.95 The
complex relationship between colonialism, the state, and chauvinism was one of the main factors
that held womenÕs schooling back. The colonial powers did not want women to excel in the teaching profession because that jeopardized British men and womenÕs consolidation of these jobs. Nor
did they want Egyptian women (seen as a weaker faction in society) asserting their autonomy to a
colonized peopleÑnot to mention the prejudices of both patriarchal societies. Gender-based discrimination was reinforced by the colonial presence.
MusaÕs career as an inspector in the Ministry of Education ended in 1926. ÒIt appears that her
criticism of certain high officials in the Ministry of Education for conduct that today would be
called sexual harassment finally led to her expulsion.Ó96 Although a modest and religious woman,
Musa faced constant harassment because she was a woman, and her presence reminded male
teachers that their jobs were in jeopardy. Sheikhs who taught Arabic did not want women taking
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their jobs, yet they also advocated segregation of the sexes in education. It was precisely this contradiction that opened the door to Musa.
Once the hurdle of secondary schools had been crossed, the next battle was on the university
campus. Fouad I University (now Cairo University) was supposedly open to all Egyptians, yet
women were not permitted to study there. Ironically, it was Princess Fatma Ismail who had donated the money for the construction and maintenance of the University.97 In 1929, a progressive rector of the university, Ahmed Lutfi al-Sayyid, allowed a group of women to enter. Women and men
sat far apart from one another. Women feared that their reputations would be tarnished if they
were seen to mix with the other sex.98 Eventually, over the years, women entered the university in
greater numbers. However, the real watershed that mainstreamed the idea of womenÕs education
came with the 1952 revolution.
Education became one of the tools employed by President Nasser to achieve progress and
national and cultural unity. Through politics and education, the Nasser regime preached to all,
Ònot only purely political values such as democracy, socialism, and cooperation, but also civil values such as equality, awareness, and responsibility, the value of productive work, the potential of
free will, and rationalism.Ó99 1961 saw womenÕs unprecedented entrance into Al-Azhar University,
which had just undergone a modernization scheme.100 In the 1960s coeducation became prevalent
in state schools out of necessity: there was both a lack of teachers and of buildings.101 This this was
not intended for womenÕs benefit; rather, it came about coincidentally because of the scarcity of
resources. Even with government support, the education system could not adequately address the
needs of the people.
2. Work: ÒThe best way to serve this country we are ready to die for is to direct womenÕs attention to education and work.Ó102
As MusaÕs story illustrates, government jobs were not easily accessible to women and if they were
able to secure them, they were usually discriminated against in their wages. Also, once married, a
woman could no longer retain her teaching post or any other government job. Obtaining an education proved to be much easier than finding a job. The very notion of work for women outside the
home was threatening on three levels: earning an income liberated women from dependency on
men; work outside the home meant womenÕs protrusion into a public and previously male domain;
and as MusaÕs life displayed, men did not want women to rival them in the job market.103
The employment issue had different implications for different classes. A myth surrounded
upper and lower class women, that they did not really work. In actuality their Òmanagerial effort
and expertise... contributed to the financial resources of the family.Ó104 Women of the lower classes
already worked within their homes and in rural areas laboured in the fields with their families.
This was not acknowledged as work, and naturally they were not paid. As a result this last group
was not included in the debate about womenÕs work. When Nabawiya Musa, Huda Shaarawi, and
other feminists campaigned for womenÕs right to work, they were probably targeting women from
the middle and upper classes who were by then getting an education and wanted employment
102
103
104
105
106

Musa, 1920.
Badran, 1996: 165.
Macleod, 1991: 49.
Ahmed, 1993: 190-191.
Hatem, 1986: 30.

26

after graduating.
In advancing their agenda, the EFU addressed the employment issue as a nationalist one
whereby women could liberate themselves and in doing so would contribute to the liberation of
their country. The argument men used against womenÕs presence in the workplace was that they
would subject themselves to sexual exploitation, leading to a loosening of the countryÕs morals.
The latent content of this debate was that womenÕs work opportunities detracted from menÕs.
In the 1920s Egyptian women began to work in factories producing cigarettes, textiles, and
pharmaceuticals because they were a cheaper source of labor than men. Eventually however, they
were replaced by machines. By 1937, 11,000 secondary school and university graduates of both
genders were unemployed, making the situation graver for women, who had the added burden of
sexual discrimination when seeking employment.105 For those who had jobs, the situation was difficult. To ensure womenÕs security and limit sexual discrimination, the EFU campaigned for
improved working conditions. In 1933 a labor law was passed regarding womenÕs employment. It
delineated the kinds of jobs women could have, the number of hours per day they could work,
allowed them maternity leave, access to day care centers, and flexible working hours during the
lactation period. The consequence of this law was that employers became hesitant to hire women
because of the added expense of these benefits.106 These laws were on the whole not enforced and
women complained of the work hours they kept and the conditions in which they worked. The
EFU demanded that the government take action. They responded by hiring NaÕimah Al-Ayyubi as
the first inspector of womenÕs work in 1935.107
While the post-revolutionary government (1952) was seen to encourage women to obtain an
education and seek employment, the Egyptian National Charter (1962) sent contradictory messages. It told women that the family was their primary concern, and that they alone were Òto preserve the national traditionÓ within society.108 In 1963 laws were passed promoting the idea of
equal pay for equal work and equal right to promotion between men and women.109
In 1962 a woman named Hekmat Abou Zeid was appointed Minister of Social Affairs.110 During
this time, the socialist government was still sending mixed messages to Egyptian women. During
SadatÕs rule (1970-1981), a new constitution was passed. According to Article 11 of that Constitution:
...the State guarantees the reconciliation of womanÕs duties toward her family with her work in
society, and her equality with man in the political, social, cultural, and economic fields of life
without prejudice to the principles of Islamic Sharia.111
MenÕs duties to that family are not mentioned and women are painted as torn between their primary concern (the home) and their adopted environment (work outside the home). Furthermore
article 9 states that:
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Òthe family is at the
base of the society and
is shaped by religion,
ethics, and nationalism. The state pledges
to preserve this genuine character of the
Egyptian family, the
customs and values it
represents, and to generalize them to the rest
of the society.Ó
Given the emphasis of
Islam on womenÕs roles
as wives and mothers,
DORIA SHAFIK WITHOTHER WOMEN ON THE HUNGER STRIKE IN THE JOURNALISTS' SYNDICATE
grounding women within
the religious and nationalist framework was highly constricting.112 Interestingly enough, a strand
of nationalist thinking looks upon women as the producers of good sons that will add to the
nationÕs glory, not unlike the previous stance.
3. The Vote: ÒWhy Can Women Vote in Europe?Ó113
In the EFUÕs demands, a section entitled ÒAmendments to the Constitution,Ó stated that all citizens should be allowed to vote. The EFU women were not disappointed when in 1923, the new
Constitution propagated the vote for all. The surprise came three weeks later when an electoral
law was passed giving only men the vote.114 To add insult to injury, the newly elected government
opened the first session of Parliament without inviting the women who had helped them come
into power (that is, the EFU members who had earlier formed the Wafdist WomenÕs Central
Committee and dissolved it to form the EFU). Only the wives of officials and foreign women were
allowed in.115
WomenÕs attempts to participate in political life were further thwarted by the government and
the British, culminating in violent demonstrations and arrests.116 The struggle for the vote continued through the 1930s with the EFUÕs Committee to Demand WomenÕs Social and Political Rights,
making little progress.117 The Second World War stifled the debate and the death of Huda Shaarawi
in 1947 left the EFU without leadership. A new force emerged on the scene carrying on the fight
for suffrage: Doria Shafik (1908-1975) and her organization Ittihad Bint al-Nil (Daughter of the Nile
Union).
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Doria Shafik was from the generation following Huda Shaarawi and of middle class origin.
There were other feminist and political organizations during the 1950s, but for Shafik Òthe right to
vote as well as changing the socioeconomic system which underlaid the oppression of women had
to be the goals of the feminist movement.Ó118 Shafik founded two magazines, to which people
wrote seeking advice. Shafik responded by trying to mobilize men within the legislative bodies to
address womenÕs needs. She was unsuccessful. ÒIt was obvious to me,Ó she wrote in her memoirs,
Òthat women representatives were essential in Parliament.Ó119 The rebirth of a political movement
followed, aiming to secure women the right to vote and adequate political representation. The culmination of their efforts came on 19 February, 1951 when almost 1,500 women from different political groups and with opposing beliefs, headed by Shafik, organized a march on Parliament
demanding their rights.120 The women were told that their requests would be given serious
thought, but the government remained silent. On 12 March 1954 Shafik and eighteen other women
went on a hunger strike in protest.121 They were promised that the matter would be consideredthis time by the new, socialist, revolutionary government. Two years later, in 1956, women won
the right to vote.122
The march on Parliament and the hunger strike were perceived as radical acts; however,
women had tried to negotiate with the government both times and had been completely disregarded. By 1957 modest changes occurred, with two women elected to the National Assembly.123
Finally, womenÕs voices would be heard and they would have some of their civil rights. Armed
with the right to vote, women felt that the door was open. Or was it?
The 1960s and 1970s were ambiguous decades for womenÕs rights. There was a general silencing of all groups, including womenÕs organizations, perceived to be too Ôpolitical.Õ During the
1970s, First Lady Jihan Al-SadatÕs voice dominated, but her position as the PresidentÕs wife often
worked against what she tried to achieve. Women who were not part of the ÔofficialÕ regime, like
Nawal El-Saadawi (whose feminist organization was eventually closed down), were silenced.
However, the United Nations Decade for Women (1975-1985) began to revitalize the issue in
Egypt. This coincided with increased disillusionment from unfulfilled promises over womenÕs
rights, whether from the government or other movements that proposed alternative systems. The
rise of Islamism also forced Òmiddle class women to organize themselves in opposition to its
socially restrictive goals.Ó124 But the question still remains: how are Egyptian women faring today
and what is being done to improve their lot?
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III. EGYPTIAN WOMEN TODAY

As described in the last chapter, Egyptian women have struggled throughout the century to establish their presence as full-fledged partners with men in the public sphere. Their presence outside
the domestic sphere has increased as a result of numerous factors, namely education, economic
necessity, and the will of the political elite; but most importantly as a result of their own efforts.
Any threat to the gains women have made constitutes a legitimate cause for concern for both
women and men who believe that the wellbeing of society cannot be achieved or maintained
through politics of exclusion. Consequently, while the post-revolutionary government assumed a
comprehensive transformation that would encompass women, it has been noted that womenÕs liberation has never come to assume the primacy of political or economic liberation. WomenÕs particular concerns have been, and continue to be, subordinate to those of society, the nation, and
development. Also, Egyptian men like their counterparts in the West have resisted the process of
redefining gender roles and allowing women more equity.125
The growing presence of women in the public sphere has not been paralleled by more equity. In
her description of their condition, Elizabeth Fernea notes that the large number of university graduates among Egyptian women, their increased presence in the public sphere, the fact that they
have come to occupy top positions in the economy and in the state apparatus, are contradicted by
high rates of illiteracy, minimal political participation, declining representation in parliament, and
the recurrence of modest dress.126
In this monograph we argue that these contradictions are part of the current dilemma women
face. Their progress toward equity is countered by a public discourse that hampers their cause.
Their resistance is manifested in the various coping mechanisms they use to maintain and expand
their space within both the private and the public spheres. The efforts of organizations women
have formed or joined, and in the discourses these organizations are creating, have also made this
apparent (see chapter V: Strategies of Resistance).
A brief review of the current status of Egyptian women will contextualize our discussion of the
present public discourse, with its legitimation of a retreat from gender equity. Comparing
womenÕs past struggles and strides toward more effective representation in the public sphere with
their present condition confirms our contention that there has been a loss of momentum in the
advancement of their cause.
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A. WOMEN AND EDUCATION
Comparing older women and todays' young girls, women have achieved considerable headway
in the field of education. The Egyptian Constitution recognizes the right to free education for both
males and females. Despite official commitment to the education of the general population and
years of investment, disparities remain between the educational status of boys and girls. While
nearly 90 percent of children aged 8 to 11 are currently in school, girls' enrollment lays behind that
of boys. For every 100 boys enrolled in primary school, only 84 girls enrolled.127 These inequalities
are more pronounced in rural areas, with fully one-third of 10 year old girls not enrolled in rural
Upper Egypt.128
Comparing male and female illiteracy levels for all ages nationwide, we find a significantly
greater proportion of women are illiterate (62% among females as opposed to 38% for males, a difference of slightly more than 24%).129 A comparison of these percentages with those of the first half
of the 20th century reveals that the ratio of female to male illiteracy is presently higher than it has
ever been before. In 1925 illiteracy among women was 96 percent (men 78%); 1930, 95 percent
(men 76%); 1940, 92 percent (men 73%); 1945, 90 percent (men 68%); 1950, 87 percent (men 63%).130
The main reasons given for the gender gap in literacy are failure to enroll in school and school
drop-out. And while drops out rates are reportedly higher for boys than for girls, they remain
alarmingly high for both genders, especially at the primary level. 131
Once in school, girls do well. However, economic conditions and the insufficient value placed
on girlsÕ education continue to limit their attainment. Many parents refrain from sending their
daughters to school at all because the perceived economic returns do not outway the costs (real
and opportunity) of investing in girlsÕ education. In addition, once in school, boys and girls
receive education in different topics. For example, girls are taught home economics while boys are
taught agricultural economics, topics that are considered gender-appropriate. Moreover, the study
indicates that while the gender-based dichotomy within the educational system had been the subject of heated public debate earlier in the century, this issue has not yet been fully resolved.
WomenÕs domesticity is still promoted by the official curriulum.132
Massive population growth during the second half of the century and rural-to-urban migration
are two factors that account for much of the difference in educational attainment between genders.
The development of CairoÕs infrastructure and services did not proceed on a par with the increase
in demand. One study on the educational status of women in Egypt concludes that quantitative
and qualitative shortages of schools are main reasons behind girlsÕ low participation in education.
Not only is there a shortage and an unbalanced distribution of schools among governorates, but in
some communities, the lack of single-sex schools discourages traditionally-minded parents from
sending their daughters to school or allowing them to continue if single-sex schools are not available once they reach puberty.133 Furthermore, the influx of migrants from rural areas into the city
has resulted in the importation of rural values and norms into city life.
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As noted in the previous chapter, the large number of female university graduates at present is
due to the commitment of the post-1952 revolutionary government to the education of the general
population, part of NasserÕs modernization efforts. The policies instituted during the 1950s have
enabled large numbers of women and men to obtain university degrees. By the 1980Õs, one-quarter
of all those with higher education degrees were women.134 The figure is now closer to one half.
Today, it is the effect of those very same policies, rather than a growing appreciation of
womenÕs potential, that continues to work in favor of womenÕs education. The rising conservatism
in Egypt today is at play in changing the nature of the commitment to girlsÕ education. Education,
in this trend, is valued insofar as it enhances womenÕs roles as wives and mothers, an attitude that
is reflected in the official school curriculum135. Moreover, education is important because it is a tool
enabling women to fend for themselves in the public sphere if the need arises.
The parallel between the justification for girlsÕ education presented by the contemporary conservative trend and that presented by the early womenÕs movement in the 1920s is striking. In
both cases, education has been harnessed to what feminist scholars have termed Òthe cult of
domesticity.Ó136 Moreover, as we shall proceed to argue, domesticity was then part of nationalist
efforts-it is now part of the Islamist effort.
B. WOMEN AND THE MEDIA
The image of women in the media is indicative of the values and norms that are woven into the
Egyptian social fabric. As presented in the media, women as mothers, wives, and daughters are in
need of protection, the provision of which is incumbent upon their fathers, husbands, and brothers. In
exchange for such protection, women are required to submit to male authority. A womanÕs rebellion
against such submission is portrayed as deviance, which must be both repented and Ôpaid for,Õ or as
an indication of womenÕs capricious and fickle nature. In the meantime, the man is portrayed as wise,
compassionate, generous, and knowledgeable about what is best for his women (harimuh).137
Another image that emphasizes the inequality between genders is the portrayal of a sexual infidelity in marriage. A husbandÕs infidelity is portrayed as a temporary aberration, while a wifeÕs
unfaithfulness is portrayed as a crime. Accordingly, a wise wife waits for her husband to return to
his senses. Her patience and compassion are rewarded by her husbandÕs repentance and return to
the fold. The image of the dignified matriarch whose triumph resides in having kept the family
together has become a classical representation in the Egyptian media.
In contrast to the image of a patient, long-suffering wife is that of the outraged husband who is
expected to react swiftly to his wifeÕs adultery.138 As a consequence of her behavior, the adulteress
is shown to spend the remainder of her life paying for her crime, and is often shown to have compromised her childrenÕs chances of marriage. The implication is that women are responsible for
their own victimization, as well as that of their children. Should any ill beset her or the children,
the misfortune is inevitably linked to her ÔdeviantÕ actions.
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Linked to this image is that of the precarious situation of a woman without a man. A woman
alone is pitied because she has no one to stand for her or back her (dahr). The term waleya (dependent) is used to emphasize the inherent vulnerability of women, which is increased if she does not
have a guardian (wali) to take care of her. This protection theme is constantly disseminated by the
media.
In a culture that is skeptical about womenÕs ascendance onto male-dominated planes, womenÕs
success is also a matter of bemusement. Working women are portrayed in the media as somewhat
masculine and their husbands as deprived of the warmth and tenderness they would normally
expect from a wife who has no professional occupation or ambition. This is depicted in the Arabic
film produced in the 1960s, Meraty Mudir ÔAm (My Wife is a General Manager), a comedy starring
Salah Zulfikar and Shadia. Zulfikar plays the role of
an employee working under the supervision of his
wife. Although the movie ends with ZulfikarÕs willing acceptance of his wifeÕs well deserved seniority,
her executive looks are portrayed as somewhat lacking in femininity while his exasperation with this
ÔunusualÕ situation seems endearing.
Recent films do not differ much in their portrayal
of women professionals. Busy pursuing their careers,
female professionals are blamed for any family or
conjugal mishap. Moreover, the film Istiqalet Alemat
Zara (The Resignation of a Nuclear Physicist) is but
another example of the media stressing the inability
of women to combine career and family. Soheir ElBably, portraying a respected nuclear physicist, is a
stickler for punctuality and professional standards.
However, as soon as she discovers she is pregnant,
she rethinks her priorities and consequently starts
neglecting her work.
A POSTER OF THE FILM "MY WIFE IS A GENERAL MANGER".
The stereotyping that prevails in the mass media
is legitimated by reference to essentialist arguments.
Because of their biological constitution, women are argued to be emotional and erratic. They are
fragile, superficial beings who care only about appearances. These are but a few examples of the
type of images disseminated by the media.139
Studies on the impact of stereotyping indicate that women do not identify with the images portrayed by the media, and that their creativity and interaction with society is hindered by the values it promotes. Moreover, the inadequacy women feel as a result of not identifying with the
images has been linked to their receptiveness to conservative ideologies. A significant segment of
middle class women find the traditional role models of mother and wife more appealing than the
more complex reality of professional women who might also be wives and mothers.142
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C. WOMEN AND WORK
Arab countries have some of the world's lowest female labor force rates. Traditionally, men have
been responsible for the economic support of their families, and only a minority of very poor or
very wealthy women were economically active in the public sphere. After the 1952 revolution,
however, opportunities opened up for women, allowing them more space in the public sphere.
Nevertheless, for a number of reasons, including male unemployment womenÕs participation in
the labor market has remained modest. The percent of women in the labor force in Egypt has risen
somewhat over the last decade, in 1995 the percent working for wages (not familly workers) stood
at 21% of urban women, 11% of rural women.141
Article 14 of the Constitution of 1971142 gives all citizens equal access to public employment irrespective of gender. Law 137 of 1981 allows women to work at night in hotels, theaters, and airports as long as adequate protection is provided (a rather ambiguous clause that is largely
ignored). Despite such increases in womenÕs labor force participation, womenÕs average wages are
approximately one-third lower than those of men. On the whole, women hardly ever reach leadership positions, and when they do, the occurrence is viewed as an anomaly. Moreover, womenÕs
representation in labor unions remains insignificant; only 621 women belong to labor unions compared to 17,441 men.143 This suggests that women do not perceive unions as beneficial to their
interests.
WomenÕs business initiative and acumen are constrained by their entrenchment in the domestic
sphere, restrictions on their mobility, and by their lack of exposure to information about loans and
training opportunities. Consequently, small, traditional, home-based enterprises are often
womenÕs only alternatives. This is especially true among women from the middle and lower
socioeconomic strata who, instead of reallocating the income from these enterprises to the expansion or upgrading of the business, are often required to use it for household and other emergency
purposes. Moreover, the skepticism surrounding womenÕs business abilities often works as a
deterrent to their entrepreneurship.
The discouragement of womenÕs economic role is legitimated by the prevailing value system
and associated norms. These values and norms denigrate womenÕs labor and contrast it to
womenÕs domesticity, which is generally commended and even, in the case of the Islamists, sublimed. The perpetuation of the image of the house as a womanÕs kingdom is part of the resistance
of society to womenÕs emancipation. Moreover, women who have ventured in the public sphere
have often been blamed for much of the violence inflicted upon them, both in the work place and
on the street, while domesticity has been presented as the way for women to preserve their dignity.
Women are also subjected to other difficulties that further their isolation from the public
sphere. Working hours that are incompatible with family obligations and inappropriate modes of
transportation are among the many factors that women encounter both in private and in public
sector employment. The letter cited below, from female government employees, illustrates the
institutional obliviousness to the multiplicity of roles that women play:
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By Force...Not By Choice: It is true that the evening shift at the Registry office is optional and
not mandatory, yet this is only in theory. The reality is somewhat different. Women represent
approximately 80% of all employees at the Registry; consequently, whoever refuses to work in
the evening is deprived of the additional income which is in fact a major source of income for
most of us. Moreover, the way the shifts are organized from 8:00 am to 2:00 pm, and from 5:00
pm to 8:00 pm make it impossible for us to go home and come back. Most of us live in remote
areas, and the traffic does not help. By the time we go home, it is already time to leave for
work. What about our children? How are they supposed to fare during our absence. We would
prefer to work one long shift from 8:00 am till 4:00 or 5:00 pm so that we can fulfill our obligations both at work and at home. We hope that the Minister of Justice will understand our conditions and that he will be receptive to our suggestions. (signed by: Tortured employees of the
Registry).144
A study by Nassar on the employment status of women in Egypt shows that menÕs occupational
structure is more evenly distributed than that of women. Women work in a limited number of
occupations at all levels of the occupational ladder. Moreover, unemployment among women is
widespread, and higher than it is among men, and the duration of their unemployment is
longer.145 Given the concentration of women in the government sector, MacLeod notes that women
are bound to be more negatively affected than men by the governmentÕs retreat from its role as a
main employer. 146
Gender-based discrimination even extends to child labor. A study conducted by Nadia Farah
Ramsis for UNICEF revealed that only 22 percent of female child workers are paid, as opposed to
58 percent of their male counterparts.147 This is largely because girls are more likely to work in
family enterprises, especially agricultural ones.
D. WOMEN AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION
Political participation and representation are issues of concern for Egyptians regardless of gender.
The apathy characterizing participation in the Egyptian political process has been noted by many
scholars, but a discussion of this apathy is beyond the scope of this monograph. However, despite a
general lack of political participation and representation, the situation among women is especially
dismal. The marginal presence of women in Parliament has become especially evident since 1990,
when the law setting a quota of seats reserved for women was declared unconstitutional. The idea
that politics is a male preserve is inculcated into women from childhood and throughout adolescence, via a conservative discourse that portrays different roles and obligations for each gender.
While the 1956 Constitution asserts equality between women and men in the exercise of their
political rights, womenÕs registration to vote in electoral ballots is optional while menÕs is obligatory. In the mid 1990's the level of women's registration remained less than 10 percent.148 The actual
participation of women in Parliamentary elections was only 6 percent in 1990.149

144
145
146
147
148
149

Al Ahram, November 5, 1997 (authorÕs translation).
Nassar, 1996b.
Macleod, 1991: 8.
Farah, 1997.
Ibid: 412.
Gomaa, 1996: 74.

36

Family opposition, limited knowledge of the law, and scarce resources combine to discourage
women from entering the political arena. A research project based on case studies of women parliamentarians indicated that family support has been a crucial factor in determining the course of
their political careers.150 These women however, are exceptions. The political game is a dirty and
rough one, in which men-as the supposed stronger species-are more apt to engage.
Further, when campaigning in elections, womenÕs effectiveness is limited as they tend to
abstain from raising or engaging in debates related to gender issues for fear of compromising their
chances of being elected. The reluctance of political parties to support women from their own
ranks also restricts womenÕs candidacy in elections.151 Awareness of the constraints to womenÕs
political participation has prompted the formulation of a program of action to enhance their participation in decisionmaking processes. A workshop was held prior to the 1995 elections in order
to formulate an electoral program for Egyptian women.
One survey of action-oriented interventions designed to enhance the socioeconomic status of
Egyptian women recommended that a center for supporting women candidates be established. It
also recommended that the laws affecting womenÕs political participation be revised, and that
women be trained in leadership skills in order to serve as leaders for poor communities.152 The
Huda Project, initiated by the Ibn Khaldoun Center for Development Studies in 1995, is designed
to provide women with such support.
E. WOMEN AND THE LAW
Another area in which women have not been treated equitably is the law. While contention has
been strongest regarding the family and nationality laws, women are also short-changed in the
penal code. Though much of the discrimination that takes place is due to the interpretation of the
text and its application, which are left to the discretion of a predominantly male judicial body,
there is also a differentiation between genders in the body of the text. A notable example is the difference in the penalty for the murder of oneÕs spouse upon discovery of adultery. Whereas men
are given a light prison sentence (not more than three years) for murdering their adulterous wives,
women are often sentenced to hard labor for life for murdering their unfaithful husbands. This
difference is justified by the widespread attitude that a manÕs honor is dependent upon his wifeÕs
virtue. Consequently, his violent reaction to his wifeÕs adultery becomes excusable, especially if
committed in the heat of the moment.153
The interpretation of the text also presents problems. Although rape itself is penalized, forced
or non-consensual marital intercourse is not considered by the law to constitute a criminal offense.
However, a study conducted by the New Women Research Centre and El-Nadim Centre found
that 93 percent of the women in the sample considered intercourse under such conditions as rape.
The fact that 46 percent of the men in the sample said they are entitled to force their wives into
intercourse reveals the discrepancy between their world view and that of women.154
The penal code is also applied differentially by gender. In cases of spousal battering, the punishment is usually harsher for a woman who beats her husband than for a husband who beats his
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wife. By law, husbands are entitled to physically punish their wives in case of disobedience
(maÕsseya) so long as no permanent damage is inflicted, yet women are not allowed similar provisions. The difference in penalties exacted from each gender reflects the preeminence of a value system in which the purity of women is assigned utmost importance, and menÕs sexual latitude is
indulged. Moreover, the supremacy (qawama) of men over women is accepted with varying
degrees among Egyptians of both genders. For example, the 1995 Egyptian Demographic and
Health Survey found that a not insignificant number of women, especially among lower and middle income women and those residing in rural areas, believed that wife beating was justified
under certain circumstances. 155
Also contentious is the nationality law. Law 26 of 1975 stipulates that an Egyptian woman married to a non-Egyptian man cannot confer her nationality onto their offspring, yet if the father is
unknown, the children are registered as Egyptian citizens. Men do not face the same problems.
Non-Egyptian wives can apply for Egyptian nationality two years after marriage, and their children are automatically registered as Egyptian citizens at birth, regardless of their motherÕs nationality. The social, political, and economic implications of this law extend far beyond the blatant
differentiation between men and women. One implication is that the offspring of Egyptian mothers
married to non-Egyptians are deprived of all the rights and privileges of Egyptian citizens. They
cannot vote, serve in the army, or be employed in the government. They are required to obtain residence visas and work permits. They register at schools and universities as foreigners and consequently pay fees that are much higher than they would otherwise pay as Egyptians. The economic
burden that this law entails is often shouldered by the mother who is forced to resort to extreme
measures to bear the costs involved. Moreover, the ÔpreventiveÕ and hence ÔprotectiveÕ aspects of
the law are emphasized and presented as justifications for the persistence of discrimination.156
Suggestions for reform remain unheeded. Consequently, the nationality law remains a main
item on the agenda of Egyptian feminists, together with the Personal Status Law. Despite decades
of active lobbying, the government has resisted changes in the personal status law, so much so
that the law has been described as the ultimate Ò bastion of control.Ó157
F. WOMEN AND HEALTH
Education, employment, and socioeconomic status are all determinants of health. Given the generalized disparity between genders, one would also expect to find disparites in the health status of
men and women. This is indeed the case. These disparities are more visible in rural areas than in
urban settings, and are compounded by social values and norms that impart added value to the
life of men.
Research indicates that while there are biological factors accounting for the health problems
affecting women, a strong social dimension is also present. Despite growing opportunities for
education and decreases in infant mortality rates, the birth of a boy remains a source of greater
happiness and pride than that of a girl. This sentiment pursues women throughout their life cycle.
Families of lower socioeconomic status, and especially in rural areas, lavish less attention and
health care on their daughters than they do on their sons.158
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The predominant norm that encourages womenÕs domesticity and motherhood has tremendous implications for their physical and psychological health. It perpetuates a pattern of early
marriage and reproduction that is detrimental to both the womanÕs and the infantÕs health.159 Early
marriage also endangers womenÕs lives, in several ways. First, women who marry early are
exposed to the risks of pregnancy and childbirth for longer periods of time; this is especially problematic in countries like Egypt that have high maternal mortality rates. Moreover, although statistics on maternal mortality are notoriously inaccurate, younger women face higher risks of dying
during pregnancy and childbirth than older women. Furthermore, a longer reproductive life
increases the risk of unwanted pregnancy, which a woman could choose to terminate in an abortion, a risky undertaking because of its illegality in Egypt (except for those women whose lives are
endangered by the pregnancy). Women are forced to resort to clandestine procedures, which pose
serious health risks or even result in death (deaths that are usually underreported). According to a
study on the quality of reproductive health care services, 46 percent of abortions in Egypt are performed in Ôback alleyÕ clinics.160 Research also indicates that children born to mothers under age 20
are more likely to die than children born to older mothers.161 A thorough discussion of such
increased risks is beyond the scope of this monograph. However, in addition to the likelihood of
being physically immature themselves, young mothers in Egypt today are more likely to have
come from disadvantaged backgrounds and suffer from accumulated health conditions such as
stunting. In addition to these physiological issues, young mothers tend to have shorter intervals
between births than older mothers, thus placing subsequent children at greater risk of death.
Moreover, women who marry early tend to curtail their education, thereby limiting their access to
crucial health and hygiene information that could offset these other disadvantages.162 Additional
factors working against womenÕs health are cultural norms that encourage women to put their
familiesÕ needs ahead of their own and to neglect their own health problems. ÒSilent enduranceÓ is
a cultural norm for women that results in much of the inequity women bear.163
Women in Egypt are also subjected to female circumcision, often called female genital mutilation (FGM). In Egypt, this procedure typically involves the partial excision of the external genitalia. Despite having adverse effects on womenÕs health, the practice is almost universal among
ever-married Egyptian women.164 It also enjoys a high level of support among Egyptian women,
especially among non-working women and those residing in rural and urban slum areas, who
believe it to be a Ògood traditionÓ with many benefits.165
Restricting womenÕs options entails limiting their effective participation in society. Moreover,
confining womenÕs domain to the private sphere has implications that extend beyond their exclusion from the public sphere. WomenÕs health, general wellbeing, and even their nurturing capabilities are diminished by the lack of exposure that such confinement entails. This reality is both
reflected and reinforced in the public discourse. The dominance of the theme of womenÕs domesticity in this discourse reveals, as we shall discuss in the next chapter, the imperviousness of a predominantly male-dominated ideology to womenÕs interests and concerns.
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IV. THE PUBLIC DISCOURSE IN EGYPT

In order to grasp the significance of the conservatism, which we contend permeates the prevailing
Egyptian discourse, it is important to identify the focal theme of this discourse. Our contention is
that equity was the focal theme of the transformation that was supposed to have taken place after
independence, and that half a century later it remains the problematic of the development process.
Gender-equity is just one of the achievements that the post-revolutionary government was supposed to have realized. However, it was never a priority for the new regime. Rather, as noted
above, it was a promised trade-off for womenÕs participation in the nationalist struggle that was
later compromised once national independence was attained. The margin of liberty that was
availed to women was supposed to allay what has been described as Òthe radicalizing consequences of womenÕs political participation.Ó166 The perennial relegation of womenÕs enfranchisement to the bottom of the priority list is the result of political expediency.
Historically, whenever it has been advantageous to treat women as full-fledged partners, men
have had no compunction in engaging in such a partnership. Moreover, whenever the situation
warrants a closing of ranks, factional divisions are set aside, albeit temporarily, until the objective
of the partnership is fulfilled. The mobilization of women during the nationalist struggle is a case
in point. Both liberal and conservative men encouraged womenÕs activism during the struggle
without seeming overly disturbed by the gender dimension of such activism. However, when
womenÕs activism was perceived to no longer serve the nationalist cause, the men withdrew their
support.167 In fact, it has been noted that the liberal politicians of 1919 never intended to defy the
religious establishment regarding inequalities in the Sharia, as has the unwillingness of the postrevolutionary regime of 1952 to tackle these issues.168
Similarly, decades later, the status of women is expressed in a manner that does not place the
(male) interlocutors, whatever their positioning on the political spectrum, on a collision course.
Whereas they might stand at opposing ends on almost every issue, there is significant consensus
regarding women. How else can we explain that despite the century-long efforts of individual
women and womenÕs groups, the contentious personal status and nationality laws, as well as the
practice of female circumcision remain unresolved?
The reversals of Decree 44 (JihanÕs law) regulating polygamy, the Minister of EducationÕs
Decree 113 of 1994 regarding the wearing of the hijab in schools, and the controversy surrounding
the Minister of HealthÕs Decree 261 of 1996 forbidding the performance of female circumcision in
all state hospitals and clinics, illustrate the convergence of conservative social trends with Islamist
views. These issues will be discussed in the ensuing sections.
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A. WOMEN: DIFFERENT BUT EQUALLY WORTHY
The stateÕs manipulation of religious symbols as a means to coopt the Islamic wave, and the
polemic of both the religious establishment and the opposition have acted as catalytic forces
encouraging much of the inequitable treatment of women. The fact that all debates have been carried within the framework of an Islamic context has been noted, and is reflected in the additional
media space that was made available to the official religious establishment and in the infusion of
religion over time into the school curricula.169
A discussion of the themes and issues that have been controversial during the past decade, and
the position adopted by the state and the Islamists will substantiate our claims concerning the
unfulfilled promises to women. This should not be construed to imply that women are totally
absolved of the responsibility for this situation.170 Some women activists have also promoted
change but in different and conflicting directions. Notable examples are Labibah Ahmed, Zeinab
Al-Ghazali, and Kariman Hamzah who, despite their active presence in the public sphere, have
carried forth the notion of gender distinctiveness, therefore imparting a message of gender complementarity rather than equality. These women, together with other supporters of the conservative
agenda, find it necessary to emphasize the superiority of women as family nurturers. It is important to note that womenÕs support of customs and traditions that often constrain their lives is a phenomenon that occurs in many cultures; it is neither unique to
Egypt, nor to Islamic or other developing countries.171
ÒI chose to stay home and raise men like Khalid AlIslamboli.Ó172 This statement is an excerpt of an interview conducted in the 1980s with a veiled woman (Mona) who had
given up her university teaching post. Staying home for her
was a militant endeavor. Many other women who share this
discourse have chosen to work outside their homes, but
claim this to be a temporary measure until circumstances
allow them to retreat from the public sphere and return to
their ÔnaturalÕ domain in the home. While for many the
change in circumstances is tied to their economic situation,
for a minority of women such as Mona, the change of circumstances entails much more comprehensive and longterm change. In a study of Zainab Al-Ghazali, Cooke notes
that for such women Ò[T]he ideal of womenÕs domesticitythe domain of menÕs rights over their women-is to be
shelved until the Islamic state is restored.Ó173
The contradiction inherent in this argument seems to
escape women like Al-Ghazali. The fact that they are fighting their battle outside the private domain is justified on the
same grounds that violence is condoned by a faction of
ZEINAB AL-GHAZALI
169
170
171
172

173

Ibid: 61.
Ibid: 1.
Kandiyoti, 1991b.
Al-Islamboli is the young officer who killed president Sadat in October 1981 during the parade held in celebration of the
1973 victory against Israel.
Cooke, 1994: 1-20.

42

Islamic activists. Being in an Ôabode of warÕ (dar harb) justifies behavior that would not be accepted
once Islamic rule, and the Ôabode of peaceÕ (dar salam), are reinstated.
Other women have adopted part of the Islamic discourse while going on with their lives and
careers as usual. The fact that they have become more religiously and ritually observant and more
observant of certain dictates, such as a more modest code of dress, does not entail their retreat into
the private sphere. On the contrary, for some women, especially in low-income urban districts, the
observance of religion in a visible manner has given them unprecedented freedom and leverage.
They are allowed greater than usual access to the public sphere, in addition to becoming relatively
immune to various forms of sexual harassment.
B. THE PERSONAL STATUS LAW AND THE NEW MARRIAGE CONTRACT
O mankind, we have created you male and female and appointed you races and tribes, that you may
know one another (49, 13)
This verse from the Quran has often been used to legitimate the Ôcomplementarity of the genders.Õ
Equality such as that sought by the amended Personal Status Law 44 of 1979 and the proposed
new marriage contract have been the subject of fierce resistance from both secular and religious
establishments. When President Sadat issued the presidential decree known as Law 44 (or JihanÕs
Law, because of support from First Lady Jihan Sadat), it was met with vehement resistance from
all factions of the political spectrum. The secularists opposed it on procedural grounds because
Parliamentary approval had not been secured. The religious establishment, the opposition, and
other conservative forces objected to the law on the basis that it did not conform to Sharia. The
main supporters of the amended law were its initiator and patron (Mrs. Sadat) and a group of
feminists who celebrated it as a victory crowning their long struggle for a less discriminatory personal status law. The law did not receive adequate support from society at large, but especially
from men, for a number of reasons. Most importantly, the amendments had economic implications
that favored women; in addition, both men and women refused to relinquish the tradition of
menÕs superior hold over women.
Under the amended law, a woman obtained the right to ask for a divorce on the basis of injury
(darar) within one month of being officially notified of her husbandÕs marriage to another woman.
After this month, she could no longer claim injury; thus in case of divorce, she lost her rights as
stipulated by law. The main advantage of the amended law was that it gave women the right to
refuse being part of a polygamous relationship, without being legally and materially penalized.
Prior to this amendment, women were often not notified of their husbandÕs second marriages; and
if they objected and asked for a divorce, they lost their rights to alimony and to remain in the marital home as long as they retained custody of their children, in addition to any other material compensation stipulated in the marriage contract.
The law also curtailed another practice called bayt al-taÕah (house of obedience) (discussed previously). In order to enforce his wifeÕs obedience, a man had had the right to call upon the authorities to enforce his wifeÕs return to the marital home. The practice has been the cause of much
controversy because it forced a woman to remain married until she could legally prove that the
marital relationship could no longer be sustained. As it stands now, after the rescindment of Law
44, the wife forfeits her right to financial support if she disobeys or fails to contest her husbandÕs
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summons within 30 days.174
The widespread objections to Law 44 resulted in its reversal and the subsequent reinstatement
in amended form as Law 100 of 1985. The new amendment made Sharia the sole basis for personal
status legislation rather than one of its bases. Thus Islamic law became the one and only frame of
reference for matters pertaining to personal status.
The idea of the new marriage contract was born in the mid-1980s; however, due to opposition,
it has not yet come into effect.175 Apart from requiring a medical examination before marriage, the
new contract contains no compulsory clauses. Aspiring to more equity within the institution of
marriage, this new contract provides a checklist, which includes many issues. The existing marriage contract allows for the inclusion of conditions agreed upon by the partners; however, the fact
that it does not include a checklist intimidates women and discourages them from establishing
themselves on a more equal footing within marriage. For example, among the most contentious
issues of the new marriage contract is that it allows both spouses the right to divorce (Ôesma).
Other possible clauses relate to ownership of the furniture and conjugal home, as well as the right
to education and travel. The new marriage contract has been decried under the pretext that it
would lead to the disintegration of the family and an increasing number of divorces. A wellknown proverb is often cited in rebuttal to the proposed contract: ÒAl-markeb eli leha rayessin
teghraqÓ (ÒA ship with two captains sinksÓ).
Most vocal womenÕs organizations in Egypt (refer to chapter V: Strategies of Resistance) focus on
research, monitoring, advocacy, counseling and service provision. The effectiveness of their work
on the ground is limited due to legal, as well as institutional constraints. Law 32 of 1964, which
regulates associations, has been criticized for restricting the ability of NGOs to address community concerns because excessive regulations that limit their ability to act in a timely manner.176 For
example, while religious NGOs have the freedom to mobilize funds through alms (zakat), non-religion based NGOs are not allowed to solicit funds unless they obtain special permission to do so
from the Ministry of Social Affairs.177
Opposition to reform of the Personal Status Law and the marriage contract is embedded in
ignorance of the law, as well as in conservatism. For example, most Egyptians do not know that
the existing marriage contract does not oppose the inclusion of provisions such as sharing the
right to divorce. Moreover, practices that the proposed changes were designed to curtail are justified in a patronizing manner. The gist of such justifications is that protection of women, family,
and society are incumbent on men and that polygamy, bayt al-taÕah, and male monopoly over the
right to divorce are mechanisms that enable them to fulfill this obligation.
Resistance to Law 44 took many forms. While some were able to vocalize their opposition, the
majority expressed their standpoint by circumventing of the law (men) or by choosing not to exercise their rights (women). For example, some men avoided notifying their wives of their second
marriages, and some women, upon being informed of their husbandÕs second marriages, chose
not to exercise their legal rights. For these men and women, the social ramifications of the proposed amendments were as contentious as the economic ones.
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The conservative tendencies of the Egyptian middle class have been explained as the result of
their exposure to rigid interpretations of Islam, either directly through migration to the oil-producing Gulf countries during the late 1960s and the 1970s, or indirectly through contact with
returning migrants. Consequently, the manner in which opposition to Law 44 and to the new marriage contract was expressed can be said to reflect the changed circumstances and world view of
the middle class.178
This conservatism of the middle class is accompanied by a focus on gender relations and sexuality. In her study of politics in CairoÕs popular quarters, Singerman explains the centrality of gender issues and sexuality in the prevailing discourse as a reflection of the confrontation between
secular and religious ideologies. Singerman describes the way sexuality has been used by the
Islamists to justify their claims to legitimacy, giving as an example a wave of rapes in 1985 that
they claimed was the result of the unbridled contact between men and women.179
Moreover, the state has also used gender relations and sexuality to discredit the Islamists. For
example, the state-controlled press has described how Islamists lure young girls and women away
from their families and husbands for marriage. These unofficial (urfi) marriages have been criticized and declared invalid because of the element of furtiveness. According to Sharia, a marriage
is only valid if it is openly declared (Ôalani). And, while the protection of women and the family
have been cited in the argument against contracting an urfi marriage, the state has been unwilling
to challenge such a marriage on the basis that it is religiously legal.
The unwillingness of the state to challenge the premises upon which much of the Islamist discourse on women is based is apparent in the way that the public discourse is managed and in the
messages that are disseminated through the media. State policies are promoted through the same
channels that fail to educate the public about the legal and social ramifications of the actual and
proposed family law and Personal Status Law. Moreover, the most common misconceptions
regarding gender relations and roles are perpetuated through media representations that are
allowed to exist virtually unchallenged, once again confirming our argument that there are
grounds of agreement between the state and the Islamists.
C. ISLAMIC ATTIRE AND THE NEW VEIL
O Prophet tell thy wives and thy daughters and the women of the believers to draw their cloaks close
round them. That will be better, that so they may be recognized and not be annoyed. Allah is ever
Forgiving, Merciful (33, 59)
The veil has been a contested symbol and focus of controversy. In the first half of this century the
veil was seen as a symbol of womenÕs subordination. Its removal has come to symbolize their
emancipation and the demise of the harem. However, a new headcover appeared following the
1967 Arab-Israeli war, one that is different from that traditionally donned by women in rural areas
and in popular quarters of Cairo, one that holds no ideological significance. The traditional veil
reflected the polarization of genders, the new veil, part of the actual Islamic attire (al-ziy al-Islami),
amplifies the schism between Muslims and Christians; but more so the divide between Islamists
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and Ôsecularists.Õ The former being perceived by a sizeable segment of the population as role models (qudwa), and the latter as deviants (munharifin). This new polarization has led to protracted
confrontations and numerous incidents of violence involving Muslims and Christians and Islamic
militants and civilians.180 While reported incidents such as the throwing of acid at unveiled women
are rare, women are undeniably bearing the brunt of the tension created by these divisions. The
fact that women who have chosen not to wear the Islamic attire are nevertheless dressing in a
more conservative manner than they did in the 1960s and 1970s is a reflection of the pressure they
feel to conform to Islamic norms.
Appearing in the mid-1970s, the headcover now referred to as hijab, khimar, or niqab (depending
on the extent of covering) was first worn by university students. Although it caused a certain
amount of friction between these students and faculty members, it nevertheless prevailed thanks
to the efforts exerted by Islamists both on and off campus. The ensuing years witnessed an
increase in the popularity of Islamic attire to include employees in government offices and
schools. Various reasons have been advanced to explain the popularity of this attire; some argue
that it blurs distinctions based on class or wealth, and others have argued that it increases
womenÕs access to public space. Some also suggest that those who wear it do so to make a statement, to separate themselves (the Ôtrue believersÕ) from the rest of society.181
The Minister of EducationÕs Decree 113 of 1994, stipulating that girls could only wear the headcover at school if parental consent was obtained, has brought upon him the wrath of conservative
forces from both within and outside of the system. The decree was precipitated by an incident at
Qasim Amin School for Girls, in which a headmistress forbade unveiled girls from attending
school.182 Examining the content of mainstream media coverage, it is clear that public opinion was
divided between those who deplored the undemocratic attitude of the headmistress and those
who defended her under the pretext that her aim was to protect the students from harassment in
the street on their way to or from school.183
A public debate ensued on the appropriate dress code for women in the work place, especially for
employees of religious establishments and affiliated institutions. The Islamic press mounted an attack
on the Ministry of Religious Endowments (awqaf) because it employed unveiled women. The gist of
the diatribes was that their laxity in enforcing the Islamic attire was unforgivable, since Islamic institutions should be role models for the rest of society. The Ministry was apologetic and focused its
response on the fact that the law did not allow the enforcement of any dress code. In addition, a number of unveiled employees were cited explaining that they did not cover their heads because their
husbands had threatened them with divorce if they did so. Finally, Ministry officials argued against
forcing women to don a headcover that they would only shed upon leaving work, asserting that convincing women of the importance of being properly attired would prove worthier in the long run.184
The significance of the veil or Islamic headcover in relation to gender equilibrium was not focal
to this discussion, which lasted until 1994 when the decree was reversed and declared illegal on
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procedural grounds. Throughout the discussion, the conservative polemic prevailed. The Islamic
dress code was portrayed as a protective shield for self-respecting women. This implied that
unveiled women are not worthy of such sentiment; but, more importantly that they are responsible
for the aggression perpetrated against them. In contrast, menÕs responsibility for acts of aggression
was rendered secondary to that of ensuring that the women of their households were properly
attired. It is very important to realize the impact that this discourse has on women who choose not
to conform to the Islamic dress code, identifying them as legitimate targets for violence.
The repercussions of these messages extend beyond the infringement on liberty of dress to
include various forms of harassment and discrimination against women. The example of the
Qasim Amin school is a case in point. The reversal of the MinisterÕs decree lays the ground for discrimination against unveiled girls by school staff. The perception of these girls as morally lax, and
hence deserving of punishment or unworthy of protection, is also extended to their families. Such
perception is legitimated by the fact that the decree was reversed by court order.
The harassment of women is often the result of a focus on their sexuality. The words used to
describe the unveiling women (sufur; tabarug; fitna) translate as unveiling, adorning, and seducing is
indicative of their representation as sexual objects. Holding them responsible for their victimization
is furthered through the propagation of imageries of debauchery and decadence. It is interesting that
the word fitna is also translated as sedition, thereby implicating women in the disintegration of
Islamic society while men are absolved from a significant measure of responsibility.
While the image of women is predominantly male-defined, women have participated in shaping it. A notable example is the article published in 1988 by Nefissa Abed in the weekly mainstream magazine October. In the course of refuting the argument of a woman professor who dared
speak against the veil, the author listed the body parts that an unveiled woman exposes, and
described such nakedness as Òan open invitation to human fliesÓ (tabaq makshuf li zobab el bashar).
This image was juxtaposed with one that the author concluded was most romantic, which is that
of the veiled woman who keeps her beauty for one man, her husband.185
This type of rhetoric, which calls attention to women only as sexual beings, is part of what the
feminist movement is attempting to change through its strategies of resistance. The Women and
Memory Forum, an Egyptian NGO described in detail in Chapter V, is an example. By revisiting
traditional Arabic texts and revealing womenÕs contribution to shaping the history and culture of
their society, the Forum is attempting to change womenÕs self-perception, as well as educating
society at large regarding gender issues.
Exposing the many ways in which women are used to further purposes and causes other than
their own is another part of the struggle that feminists have undertaken. Noting that Òno single
issue defined the Islamic way of life more than women,Ó the bringing of the veil into the public
discourse has been explained as expressing the reassertion of the superiority of Islamic values
over Western ones.186 The uneasiness characterizing the transition from traditionalism to modernism is reflected in a rejection of many of the ideas and norms associated with the West. This
rejection is based on the premise that in their focus on ÔprogressÕ after attaining independence,
Islamic countries rushed blindly to emulate the West, to the detriment of their own civilization
and cultural ethos. Yet, rejection of the West is not wholesale, even among the most entrenched of
traditionalists. Rather, most traditionalists think that Islamic countries should be more selective,
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adopting only those aspects of Western civilization that are useful and conform with Islamic values. As expected, the controversy surrounding this view results from the absence of a consensus
on the definition of what is useful and in conformity with Islamic values.
D. THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON POPULATION AND DEVELOPMENT
Say: Come I will recite unto you that which your Lord hath made a sacred duty for you: that ye ascribe
no thing as partner unto Him and that ye do good to parents, and that ye slay not your children because
of penury - We provide for you and for them - And that ye draw not night to lewd things whether opened
or concealed. And that ye slay not the life which Allah hath made sacred, save in the course of justice.
This He hath commanded you, in order that ye may discern. (7, 152)
When the United Nations International Conference on Population and Development (ICPD)
ended in 1994 and was declared successful, there was a general mood of relief. Many observers
had doubted the possibility and wisdom of holding it in Egypt after the virulent campaigns that
both the Islamists and factions within Al-Azhar University had mounted against it. In response to
these widespread concerns, the government had gone overboard confirming its commitment to
holding the conference as planned and issuing reassurances about security measures.
Although the idea of the conference as a whole was decried by the most extreme factions of the
Islamists who described it as a conspiracy among industrialized nations against developing
nations, and especially Islamic ones, the mainstream criticism was leveled against three main
items on the conference agenda. These were contraception, abortion, and female circumcision.
It is interesting to note that the IslamistsÕ arguments against contraception specifically counter
those that have been put forward in the West in its favor. The freedom to decide whether or not to
have children is perceived as giving human beings power that really belongs to God. The consequences of such usurpation of this power are moral and social decadence, and eventual annihilation. Therefore according to the Islamists, population control is a non-issue. Poverty exists
everywhere, even in countries that do not have an overpopulation problem. Poverty is perceived
to result from mismanagement of resources, corruption, and the adoption of consumerist values.
The eradication of poverty, they argue, is dependent on the coupling of increased productivity
with Islamic values.
Birth spacing (tanzim) on the other hand, is allowed by the Islamists, who cite the following
verse of the Quran to substantiate that a two-year period between births:
Mothers shall suckle their children for two whole years (that is) for those who wish to complete the suckling. The duty of feeding and clothing the nursing mothers in a seemly manner is upon the father of the
child. No one should be charged beyond his capacity. (2, 233)
The above verse has been interpreted as allowing for a period of two years between each child.
A closer look at the implications for women of favoring birth spacing over limitation reveals a situation whereby early marriage and lengthy reproductive lives result in numerious pregnancies for
most women. Even if women do not bear their pregnancies to term, their health could be adversely
affected by the subsequent termination. In addition, having many children obliges women to
retreat to the private sphere to care for their offspring during the majority of their productive years.
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The fact that abortion was on the conference agenda gave the Islamists the opportunity to
accuse conference organizers of encouraging sexual promiscuity. Allowing abortion was not only
opposed on the grounds that killing a human life is a sin and also criminalized by law, but also
that it encourages sex outside of marriage. This line of opposition was spearheaded by Sheikh
Youssef El-Karadawi, a prominent Islamic figure, and adopted both by the religious establishment
and the Islamic opposition .187
Another argument that was presented against abortion was that it would inevitably lead to the
depletion of human resources needed in the development process. The example of countries such
as Japan188 and Romania,189 who have reconsidered their Òpro-abortionÓ policies for similar reasons, are cited to substantiate this stance against abortion.190 While the notion of conspiracy is also
present in this line of reasoning, it was somewhat, though not totally, subdued by the fact that the
Vatican maintained its stance against abortion. Moreover, the Islamic religious establishmentÕs
position on abortion was somewhat divided. Al-Azhar University was adamant that Ò[N]o sexual
relations outside of marriage would be allowed, neither would abortion except in cases where the
motherÕs life is endangeredÓ191 This link between illicit sexual relations and abortion was emphasized at the expense of the reality of underreported abortions and maternal mortality due to the
complications from unsafe abortions. The MuftiÕs view, which came under attack, was much more
cognizent of reality. He conceded that under certain extreme psychological and social circumstances, abortion could also be tolerated.192
The issue of female circumcision/FGM raised (and still raises) the most controversy. This practice is prevalent in Egypt among both Muslims and Christians, in the belief that partial removal of
the external genitalia will stunt the sexual instinct, thus ensuring the proper conduct of girls.
Other reasons cited for the procedure include cleanliness (tahara) and custom (urf).193 Although
most Islamic religioius jurists admit that the practice is not rooted in Islam, there are some who
insist that it is. They base their claims on the following hadith (prophetic saying): ÒIn al-khitan
sunna lÕil-rigal mokarama lÕil-nisaÕÓ (ÒCircumcision is prescribed for men and favored for
women.Ó).194
Although it had declared the above hadith to be unreliable, Al-Azhar nevertheless avoided outright opposition to FGM. Rather, it engaged in discussions about the degree of circumcision and
the conditions under which it should be performed, to ensure the physical safety of the girl.
Information about the adverse psychological effects of FGM was ignored and the focus instead
was on proven physical harm. Islamists claimed that the West placed this particular issue on the
ICPD conference agenda in order to distort the image of developing countries, especially Islamic
ones, and in order to divert attention from the exploitative politics of the West.
However, the debate about FGM in Egypt had begun long before the ICPD, but until then in a
more discreet manner, and for the most part within the confines of the medical community. By
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bringing it into the public forum, the ICPD uncovered the diversity of positions and perspectives
related to FGM. In addition, a national coalition was created (the FGM Task Force) with the ultimate objective of totally eliminating the practice. A turning point in the FGM debate was the
broadcast of a documentary of a young girlÕs circumcision on CNN. The film was attacked, and
charges were pressed against both the producer and the network.195 The gist of the attack was the
negative image of Egypt portrayed by the documentary. It is noteworthy that people from all strata of society, regardless of their ideological orientation, felt more angered by the broadcast of the
film than by the practice.
The CNN film led to a denunciation of the practice by the Minister of Health, and a promise to
issue a law penalizing the practice of FGM. This promise resulted in the Ministerial Decree 261 of
1996, which forbade the performance of FGM in state-run medical facilities. The decree was subsequently declared unconstitutional by a district court, but a higher Constitutional court reversed
this ruling in December of 1997.196
The Egyptian governmentÕs reluctance to legislate against FGM can be understood as due to
the prevalence and sensitivity of the practice, and, also because it still enjoys wide support as a
rite of passage signaling the end of childhood and the beginning of womanhood. The state has its
own agenda, which does not necessarily include women or allow their concerns to occupy a forefront position. On the other hand, placating and containing the Islamists is a priority for the state
whose very existence depends on maintaining a balance between its own ideological requirements
and those of the Islamists. The fact that women have come to realize that they are usually shortchanged in the process is reflected in their current strategies of resistance. These have developed
based on a variety of approaches and needs, which are explored in the following chapter.
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V. STRATEGIES OF RESISTANCE

In response to womenÕs realities and problems, during the last two decades a new generation of
womenÕs rights activists-both individually and collectively-began forming alliances with those
working within a development perspective. Their aims were to create alternative discourses and
scenarios for women in the hope of eliciting positive change. They have sought to achieve this
through a wide variety of approaches: providing services, advocacy, research, publishing, and
scholarship. NGOs have become a significant vehicle for many of these activities.
Several factors are responsible for the increase in the importance of NGOs and NGOs registered
as civil companies.197 First was the failure of the government to respond to many of the basic needs
of women and society as a whole. Second, the UN Decade for Women placed womenÕs agendas on
the international scene. Third, the rise of Islamic movements in the region encouraged the formation of other social movements to counterbalance them.198
In looking at the history of organizations working on womenÕs issues in Egypt, it becomes
apparent that the level of their participation, as well as the kinds of activities they undertook, have
varied over time. Trends from womenÕs welfare and social work earlier this century still present
themselves in some organizations that target women and whose work does not overstep the
boundaries of charity into lobbying or activism. As we shall see in this section, the more youthful
organizations, those that were founded within the last two decades, with their emphasis on
women, have a different framework altogether. Activism, advocacy, and research are united in an
effort to obtain rights for women and to improve their status.
In the early decades of this century, organizations were welfare-oriented and mainly focused on
providing services such as health care, or teaching women crafts as a source of income generation.
Mubarat Mohamed Ali (discussed previously) was founded in 1908 by Huda Shaarawi and other
women from the elite and the royal family. This organization was a precursor to government health
care programs. While there was some advocacy especially from the 1920s to the 1950sÑattempts to
elicit change in laws and in womenÕs livesÑthe framework of most of these organizations was
structured around assisting the underprivileged. The EFU and the Bint al-Nil Union (Daughter of
the Nile Union) were among the exceptions. They were the most active and took the initiative in
programs geared toward womenÕs educationÑencouraging the government to follow suit.
Similarly, on the health and population front, NGOs took the initiative in family planning campaigns until the government eventually made it a state policy. However, the 1960s also ushered in
a wave of controlled activity whereby most NGOs became extensions of the government and
implemented its policies. Others adopted the less confrontational goals of charity and welfare.
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As the role of the state in the development process began to grow in the early 1950s, and was
expanded to include all areas of activities with the beginning of the 1960s, the developmental
role of NGOs dwindled and became almost exclusively confined to charitable assistance. The
exceptions were NGOs active in the field of family planning, for they played a pioneering role
in this field.199
During the 1960s the government took control of all organizations: those that were seen as beyond
government control were shut down; the rest were required to register with the Ministry of Social
Affairs (MOSA) under Law 32 of 1964. This law is being revised, and there is general anxiety in
the NGO community that it will be even more restrictive than the previous one, dealing a deadly
blow to civil society. Currently in Egypt there are 14,000 NGOs registered under the MOSA-ironically, some of these were actually set up by MOSA, which is contradictory to the meaning and
purpose of an NGO.
The 1980s and 1990s saw a change in the nature of womenÕs organizations. Some organizations
have become more vocal and refuse to be extensions of the government and its policies. During
the ICPD, representatives from many womenÕs organizations from different governorates in Egypt
met each other and were able to network. As a result, the 1990s have witnessed new structures
emerge in the womenÕs arena, the most important of which are coalitions. There are several
womenÕs networks or coalitions currently active in Egypt working in different areas: violence
against women, female genital mutilation, family planning, and reproductive health.
A. WOMENÕS ORGANIZATIONS
The organizations and projects discussed in this section are some of the best advocates for womenÕs
rights in Egypt. Following is a discussion focusing on the work of a selection of six organizations
and one project currently active in Egypt in the hope that we may do them justice.200 These particular NGOs are based in Cairo although there are others that also work outside Cairo, like CEOSS,201
that are extremely active. The Cairo-based NGOs, by virtue of their location, affect a large number
of women. This does not deny the valuable contributions that other organizations, independent
researchers, and activists have made and continue to make in various fields. However, these Cairobased organizations were chosen because they are active in fields discussed in this monograph. The
overriding rationale for their inclusion was their explicit dedication to womenÕs issues and the fact
that in many ways these organizations are pioneers in the work they do.
No Islamic organizations are discussed in this chapter because unlike the organizations portrayed here, their goals in large part are not geared toward womenÕs empowerment. That is not to
say that Islamic organizations do not provide social services. Islamic organizations on the whole
have been very active in catering to the needs of their communities (Copts and Muslims), which is
one of the main reasons for their popularity and deep-rooted support in society. However, the
gender component and the notion of gender equity are absent from their work.
Our case studies revealed a number of trends in the experiences of the organizations discussed
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here. First, common to all, was the scarcity of human resources: a lack of volunteers and the necessary prerequisites for training them. Second, most started with a fixed agenda but then moved
into related fields due to an increased demand for their services. Third, their long-term goals have
largely become focused around the desire to replicate models they have already successfully
developed in other places. Fourth, most of the organizations active at the grassroots level measure
their success according to how well they have integrated within their chosen communities and
created close ties with the inhabitants. Fifth, these organizations were created largely due to the
fact that their founders had identified a problem but were unable to find an existing forum
through which they could work. The same circumstances led to the creation of the EFU in 1923.
Sixth, reliance on foreign funding because of an unfortunate lack of local funding illustrates an
imbalance within Egyptian society that needs to be addressed.
In Egypt there is a rich tradition of charitable works such as the endowments (waqf), which go
back to Islamic traditions. During the last few decades, tables of mercy (maÕidat al-rahman) have
filled the streets during the month of Ramadan offering free meals to break the fast. The tradition
of giving is heavily ingrained in society, but often it is limited to charity and does not extend to
donations to womenÕs rights organizations. The fact that there is no local financial support for
these organizations, either through the government or private funds, indicates either a lack of
awareness and/or an unwillingness to address the issues on the part of society as a whole. Local
support comes from dedicated volunteers who work in these organizations and their circles who
may offer them non-financial support in the form of advice, consultation, translation, or similar
services.
These organizations carry our hopes for the future. We did not call this chapter Coping Strategies,
but preferred the more active Strategies of
Resistance. These organizations are not only offering services geared toward alleviating the burdens women face in their daily lives; they assist
women in different forms of resistance that will
lead to change. We hope that their continuing
efforts on behalf of women will be recognized
and supported by society in the near future.
1. Women and Memory Forum: Knowledge is
Power
In chronicling the contributions of women in
Egyptian and Arab history, it became apparent
that little was known about womenÕs lives and
that some emphasis was placed on certain
women while others were completely overlooked. Within mainstream orthodox history,
however, women have been altogether marginalized. Enter the Women and Memory Forum. A
group of women formed an organization (registered as a civil company) to explore traditional
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Arabic historical texts and to rediscover discourses on women through a gender-sensitive rereading of history. They are united by their common interest and by the interdisciplinary approach
they promote. The sharing of experiences is enriching for scholars whose interests often dictate
that they work alone. They are working toward the production of scholarly material on gender in
Arabic because research in this area is mainly in English and French. In the words of Huda
Elsadda, one of the founding members of the Forum: Ò...we wanted to make scholarly work in
Arabic available to people.Ó202
This group originally started in 1995 sponsored by the New Civic Forum. In 1997 they became
independent. ÒWe would have been happy to work through another body or forum, but that was
not possible, keeping in mind that we wanted to do scholarly research within an activist framework in Arabic.Ó203 This points to a fundamental problem: there are no specialized national institutions that would support scholarly historical work from a gender-sensitive perspective. WomenÕs
history is not a recognized topic and not one that is normally funded.
One of the aims of the Forum is to use their research to produce educational material that can be
widely disseminated. Rewriting fairy-tales and other genres of popular culture from a feminist perspective is another priority. This is intended to offer an alternative image of women and to inject
gender awareness into children and young people. The Forum is also writing biographies of
women who were involved in some feminist activity from the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries, in the hope of Òretelling the period through the lives of these women.Ó204 They also held a
two-day conference to commemorate Malak Hifni Nassef eighty years after her death.205 In June
1999, they hosted a similar event for Nabawiya Musa. Their long-term goals are consciousness-raising, the establishment of a library with manuscripts and documents that can be accessible to all
researchers, a database of material, and the creation of alternative discourses on women.
The Forum does research within an activist framework. As Elsadda notes:
We emphasize scholarly research because we feel that this is the missing link: the history of
womenÕs activism in Egypt. One of the reasons for the regression we are witnessing now is because
there is no solid accumulation of knowledge in the field of womenÕs studies within history.206
Elsadda calls the work of the Forum Òcultural development,Ó because within a holistic picture of
development, all the factors need to be examined. The Forum members firmly believe that scholarly research in history will better our understanding of what has happened and what is happening: Ò[W]omen were an important part of society and had an active role in the creation and
articulation of Arab history... they have been suppressed in orthodox, mainstream history.Ó207
Revisiting the government, Islamist, liberal, and nationalist-liberal discourses in a spirit of critique
regarding their stances on women will be extremely beneficial in the creation of alternative discourses. Ultimately, Òthe meaning and function of history in its relationship with the presentÓ has
to be explored.208
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Like other NGOs, the Women and Memory Forum receives foreign funding which is vital for
its continued existence. However, unlike many other organizations, it has been able to secure
some local funding as well. The members believe strongly in the importance of networking; hence
they produce a newsletter to enable the dissemination and sharing of information with other
researchers within the Arab world and outside it. This Forum is ultimately striving to Òconstruct
an alternate story about women, the past and the present; and in doing so challenging the dominant discourses that have put women down and belittled their achievements.Ó209
While scholarly research and activism can be seen as two mutually exclusive domains in
womenÕs development, the work of the Forum demonstrates that scholarly work, and the knowledge derived from it, is a powerful tool that, if used well, can lead to the restructuring of an entire
historical memory. In challenging and changing our perception of women and their role within
society, we can alter the preconceived ideas that govern womenÕs lives today. Only through the
added component of cultural development can a society fully develop.
2. Nour: Arab WomenÕs Publishing House
Women, especially when impoverished and uneducated, are marginalized and discriminated
against in their daily lives. This peripheral existence, however, is not confined to a certain class of
women. When a group of women decided to found Nour in 1992, they were fighting womenÕs
peripheral standing within academia and as subjects of research: Òwe wanted to provide a space
for women to publish and a forum for womenÕs issues to be discussed.Ó210 Like the Women and
Memory Forum, Nour was created to fill a void in the existing system. The founders believed that
existing publishing houses were not sufficiently sensitive to womenÕs issues and womenÕs writing,
and thus created their own.
Nour is a publishing house, but it also organizes seminars and workshops and commissions
research in various fields and publishes a newsletter. This newsletter functions as a networking
device and informs researchers and scholars of books by and about Arab women. Nour also organized the first Arab WomenÕs Book Fair in November 1995. The book fair brought together women
and men from the Arab world to discuss women-related issues. Networking, as both the newsletter and the book fair illustrate, is extremely important to Nour. The Nour newsletter Òpromotes
women, their work, and links people regionally, an important factor within the Arab world since
some voices do not get heard purely due to geographic reasons.Ó211
Nour does not confine itself to one discipline. Its publications and research projects are in the
fields of health, the social sciences, creative writing, and other topics within the humanities.
Future plans involve broadening their base, becoming self-sufficient, and getting involved in further projects. The feedback Nour has received from its projects supports the need for their work.
But as always, human resources are a problem. Nour survives on the strength of its work; more
peopleÕs time and effort are needed to achieve their goals, especially sustainability.

209
210

211

Interview with Huda Elsadda, 15 October, 1997.
Interview with Soraya Altorki, one of the founding members of Nour and a member of the board, 26 October 1997. The
Nour board is made up of seven other women from various disciplines.
Ibid.

55

Nour prides itself on having given women that Òroom of oneÕs ownÓ212 essential for the fulfillment of self-expression. As Altorki notes:
We have provided women with a space where they can express their views and get maximum
exposure in an atmosphere of equality. We give them an opportunity not just because they are
women, but because they are good and merit it. As we know, even the most qualified and gifted of women donÕt always get a fair deal.213
3. Association for the Development and Enhancement of Women (ADEW): ÒGive Me Credit for
Being a Woman!Ó214
Family structures have changed over the last three decades in Egypt, a fact that society is slowly
recognizing. Recent surveys show that at least one out of every five households is supported and
headed by a woman. Government policies, however, are based on an image of the family that
assumes that only men are breadwinners. In response to this growing trend and to womenÕs lack
of access to credit and income-earning opportunities, a group of seventeen women and three men
working in different development fields founded the Association for the Development and
Enhancement of Women (ADEW) in 1989.
ADEW grew out of a credit program for women-headed households at the Mokattam Garbage
CollectorsÕ (zabaleen) Settlement from 1985 to 1987.215 This experience made some of the members
conscious of both women-headed households and the constraints faced by poor women in accessing
credit. For example, the loans offered are typically too large for women who want to engage in small
business activities alongside their responsibilities for their homes and children. Furthermore, inappropriate collateral requirements, such as the possession of an identity card and the signature of a
male guarantor (which is required by most credit programs
in Egypt) present obstacles for women. In the words of Heba
El-Kholy, one of the founding members of ADEW:
...clearly there were a lot of families for whom women
were responsible and we found it very difficult to convince anyone else of this. We tried to replicate this project in other communities but we could not find an
institution or structure where we could do that.
Basically, then we thought letÕs set up our ownÑthat is
how it started. It started for a very specific reason: to try
and replicate a credit model and through that set up a
gender sensitive credit institution which can address
womenÕs unequal access to critical resources as well as
propagate the issue of women headed households.216
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This refers to Virginia WoolfÕs feminist essay, A Room of OneÕs Own (1987), which discusses the components necessary for
women to express themselves.
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The founders of ADEW believed that there was a category of families and women that were
perhaps consciously disregarded because their existence was threatening to the traditional notion
of the family. They set out to address this category.
ADEW started its work in Manshiet Nasser, an informal settlement at the foot of the Mokattam
hills in Cairo, generally regarded as a low-income area. ADEWÕs work has now expanded to two
other low-income areas in the city. The women ADEW targets are poor, illiterate, and responsible
for supporting a family. In the words of Heba El-Kholy:
We wanted to address womenÕs rights by addressing the needs and rights of a specific category of
women at a concrete level and then move from there to raise their concerns on a national level.
Which is exactly what we did: others are now replicating our credit model and the constraints facing women-headed households have gained the attention of both researchers and the media.217
ADEWÕs backbone is credit and technical assistance, although it has branched out to cater to other
unaddressed needs. They have supplied 1,200 women with credit-small loans that are payable with
an administrative fee-so that they can initiate or expand income-generating activities. Women have
mainly chosen to enter into food processing, vending, sockmaking and the manufacture of elastic
bands. The drawback lies in the limited growth associated with these occupations. The loans have,
however, played a crucial role in increasing womenÕs incomes as well as providing employment
opportunities for them. Other benefits for women are that: Òthe credit is partly a tool for us to mobilize women and discuss issues of concern to them, so it is more than economic support.Ó218
ADEWÕs agenda and services expanded into legal literacy and health awareness to cope with
the realities faced by the women receiving their support. The accessibility of government services,
such as pensions, emerged as a recurring problem for women-headed households: Òthere is discrimination against them as women who are illiterate and poor.Ó219 Receiving a pension from the
government involves a long, bureaucratic, and often overwhelming process for poor women who
do not have the necessary papers or the legal awareness to go about acquiring them, and who are
also intimidated by male government officials. ADEW responded by assisting women in acquiring
their identity cards, a first step in announcing a womanÕs existence to the government, and raising
this issue on a national level.
The politics of issuing identity cards are telling of the official stance regarding women: men by
law must have an identity card while women are not required to have one. Having identity cards
enables women to assert their right to equal citizenship, and by extension equal rights, with men,
rather than tolerating the status of secondary citizenship. Only with an identity card does one
become eligible for a voting card. The difficulties of procuring identity cards called attention to the
broader problem of womenÕs legal literacy. In response, ADEW began holding informal sessions
on legal awareness for women during which other organizations and independent lawyers brief
women on their legal rights. To encourage them to attend these sessions, ADEW linked the subjects with concrete issues directly affecting women in their daily struggle for survival: the identity
card or registering a business with the government-another ordeal. ÒImagine that we are
approaching the 21st century and one womanÕs dream is to get an identity card!Ó220
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ADEW has developed a credit model, based on the Zabaleen program, that they now feel can
be replicated in low-income urban and rural communities. Their focus remains on urban (particularly ÔinformalÕ) settlements. While ADEW is largely dependent on foreign funding, it is working
toward self-sufficiency so that the credit program will continue with some degree of autonomy. So
far 70 percent of the credit programÕs core costs are self-financed through the administration fee.
Another long-term goal involves legislation affecting women-headed households: ÒIf 30 percent of
the population is financially supported by women, then very basic inequalities between women
and men in the law can be very easily challenged.Ó221 These include social welfare policies,
employment policies, and inheritance laws, all of which are based on a notion of the family that
assumes men to be the sole breadwinners. ÒWhat we want to say is wait, Ôwomen are breadwinners too.Ó222
One measure of success, other than the loan repayment rate and increases in income and
employment is ADEWÕs integration into the communities in which it works. ADEW communicates and coexists with various factions within the community that do not necessarily share their
philosophy of female empowerment. There have been tensions between ADEW and some local
conservative elements that public ally questioned ADEWÕs work on the grounds that they are providing Ôunislamic services.Õ One positive result has been that these factions have begun their own
services, giving loans to men and women. Another facet of success for ADEW has been in raising
awareness: ten years ago the issue of women-headed households was dormant, while now it is
part of the acknowledged discourse. With time, continued funds, and human resources, ADEW
will continue to help women start their own small businesses and earn money, which gives them a
measure of power and autonomy. Ultimately, making women economically independent expands
their life options and enables them to challenge inequalities and gender hierarchies faced at home
and within the community at large.
4. New Woman Research Centre (Markaz Dirassat Al-MarÕah al-Gadeeda)
Five politically active women began a weekly study group in 1984 to discuss the history of
Egyptian and Arab womenÕs movement as well as some international literature, to formulate a
response to questions of whether or not there should be a specific womenÕs agenda. It met weekly
for almost two years. One of the members, Hala Shukrallah, notes:
From reading literature and the historical contexts of social movements, what was reaffirmed in
our minds was that women fully participated in bringing about social change. However, when
these movements realized their objectives, women were at once relegated back to the home.
The conclusion was that there had to be a womenÕs movement, realized in womenÕs organizations and institutions, which can both impose and emphasize womenÕs agendas on society and
on other social movements.223
During the mid-1980s, there were few forums open to women interested in womenÕs issues. The
group believes that its efforts were different because Òwe looked at a specific sector (women); we
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did not subordinate our cause to other broader social movements.Ó224 They issued a newsletter to
disseminate the ideas they had formulated to a wider audience. The need for dissemination and
feedback, combined with probing questions about what they were doing, moved this group into
public action. In 1986 a name was chosen for the newsletter that has since remained: The New
Woman.
The initial study group continued meeting in membersÕ homes (as did the earliest womenÕs
organizations). By 1991 they were attracting attention because they were still an unofficial body
and under the Egyptian Emergency laws, five people meeting regularly in a house was unwelcome. Egypt has been under Emergency laws for the last few decades, which means that some of
the normal laws have been suspended in favor of stronger government control. For example, the
government has the right to disperse a meeting between five or more people. The group finally
registered as a civil company called the New Woman Research Centre (NWRC) on 7 February
1991. The initial members changed, they opened up to new members; they are now eleven
women. All NWRC members
work on a voluntary basis; only
the administrative assistant gets
paid. Its workshops, newsletter,
and the office premises, however,
are funded by foreign donors.
After all of these changes in
membership, form, and positions,
how does the NWRC perceive
itself today? In the words of Hind
Wassef, one of the groupÕs
members:
We are a group of women from
different professional backPOSTER BY THE NEW WOMAN RESEARCH CENTRE
grounds,
generations,
and
political orientations who have
a feminist outlook and converging views on how to deal with womenÕs issues. Even in areas
where there are variations in our views, the motivation is always toward dialogue, consensusreaching, and meeting each other half-way.225
Hala Shukrallah adds:
We are organized around similar principles with the objective of creating social change, specifically targeting structural change in all that pertains to womenÕs rights, be it social, economic,
political, or cultural, using different tools and methods.226
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While women may not come and ask for credit or legal assistance, male and female researchers do
come to the NWRC for research, information, and networking.
The NWRCÕs goal is:
...to spread feminist views to as many target groups as possible. We want to be part of a democratic social movement that aims to improve womenÕs status within society and work toward
equality between the genders.227
A number of constraints on them remain, as they do on other organizations. For example, government laws do not allow demonstrations, sit-ins, or free access to the media. The NWRC works at the
grassroots and intermediary levels with other organizations, and is not specialized within one field.
In an ideal world the NWRC would like a larger membership, one that would feel some degree
of ownership of their projects. The NWRC would also like access to the radio and television; a
yearÕs schedule full of workshops; a hotline to deal with peopleÕs needs; access to schools; the
opportunity to network and form alliances with organizations around various issues; and freedom
of movement and expression. The NWRC strongly believes in working with others because working alone is futile.
5. Centre for Egyptian WomenÕs Legal Assistance (Markaz Qadaya al-MarÕah al-Masriya)
In November 1995, four lawyers (3 women and 1 man) founded the Centre for Egyptian WomenÕs
Legal Assistance (Markaz Quadaya al-MarÕah al-Masriya). They had become disillusioned with other
organizations, had not found a forum through which to address womenÕs needs, and wanted to
work at the grassroots level. They founded the organization in Boulaq al-Dakrour, one of CairoÕs
low-income urban districts. Why? ÒBecause we wanted to elicit change in Boulaq.Ó228 For the first six
months they financed themselves out of their own pockets, but are now supported by foreign funding. They chose to register themselves as a civil company and hence avoid rigorous government control should they have registered as an NGO under Law 32. As with other NGOs and womenÕs
organizations, they originally began with few objectives in mind but diversified to meet growing
demand for their services. The services currently provided by the Centre free of charge are:
¥ Literacy classes (mahw omiya): to teach basic reading and writing skills to women and men;
¥ Legal awareness: teaching women their legal rights;
¥ Legal services: these include the issuing of identity cards, voting cards, and registering
people in the civil registry office (sigil madani);
¥ Adoption of legal cases, mainly related to the Personal Status Law;
¥ A telephone hotline to which people can call to ask questions and receive legal advice;
¥ Research: Researchers trained by the Centre have gone to peopleÕs homes to understand
the needs and problems facing the inhabitants of the community.
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The number of clients that seek the CentreÕs services has increased steadily over time. In 1996 they
provided 280 people with legal services (getting identity cards or voting cards, and so forth) and
helped 84 people with their legal cases. The Centre mapped out Boulaq and divided it into five
areas to tackle each section systematically. Through their door-to-door surveys, the Centre realized
that once the initial barriers were broken, people were eager to express their problems and needs.
From 1,200 interviews with inhabitants of the Boulaq area, they have revealed massive problems
facing women and their families.
The CentreÕs short-term goals are to help women face the obstacles they encounter and to solve
some of their problems. The long-term goal of the Centre is to help women and replicate their
model in other areas all over Egypt. Azza Soliman believes in helping women to Òredefine their
concepts and beliefs so that they will, for example, rethink who to marry and whether they will
circumcise their children or not.Ó229 The Centre has had an extremely positive impact on the lives
of community members. Some women have obtained their identity cards, voting cards, birth certificates, and are continuing their education as adults. This year twenty women and one man, after
having taken literacy classes, are sitting for their first preparatory school certificates. ÒThe people
we have helped through our literacy classes tell us they finally feel they have dignity.Ó230
They have recently established another office in the city center of Cairo; thus seventeen people in
total are now working in both offices. However, they still need people willing to work within their
communities on surveys and counseling; they also need funds to train their researchers and purchase office needs. While Amnesty International donated the office furniture when it closed down its
Cairo office, the scarcity of these basic elements is a problem that continues to plague the Centre.
The Centre measures its success based on its successful integration into the community. The
inclusion of men as their clients has helped in propagating an acceptable image to the community.
The Centre has created a niche for itself in that it combines legal aid with development and human
rights. Giving women the necessary papers that they have been unable to obtain previously has reinforced their sense of identity and security; they also become eligible for government assistance.
Making women aware of their legal rights has helped them plan their futures and overcome obstacles in their lives. Trying womenÕs cases free of charge gives them sympathetic counsel in an otherwise chauvinistic and costly legal system that has little time for illiterate and poor women.
6. The Egyptian Female Genital Mutilation Task Force
Female genital mutilation (FGM) or female circumcision is an act of violence perpetrated upon
girls by society because they Òare expected to constantly provide evidence of their good behavior
and conduct... thus girls are given an early lesson, that control over women is a prerequisite for
the welfare of society.Ó231 It also has immeasurable repercussions on womenÕs psychological, mental, and reproductive health. As noted above, the Egyptian Demographic and Health Survey
found that 97 percent of ever-married women are circumcisedÑrendering it a widespread form of
violence against Egyptian women. Some women from this nationally representative sample
underwent a gynecological examination, and a validation study was done on the entire sample to
confirm the figures. FGM is defined as:
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a total or subtotal amputation of one of the organs of the female body, a practice not recognized
in any medical literature... it is performed on young girls, whose consent has not been taken or
who are not in a position to give such consent.232
In some instances it is performed without anesthesia using a knife or razor. One of the problems
faced by those trying to eradicate FGM is that due to its prevalence, society has become impervious to its extremely violent nature that mere words cannot relay.
The FGM Task Force, under the umbrella of the National NGO Commission for Population and
Development (NCPD) was officially founded in October 1994 with Marie Assaad as its coordinator. ÒWe like to look at the Task Force as a forum of individuals and NGOs who are concerned
with the issue.Ó233 The impetus to start the FGM Task Force came from lessons from the past:
ÒThere were individual efforts previously dealing with this practice but we knew that these efforts
could only go so far. Nahid Toubia234 encouraged us and we felt that unless we created a movement and got moving on basic issues nothing would change.Ó235 After the 1994 International
Conference on Population and Development (ICPD), with its focus on reproductive health issues
and the subsequent media emphasis, the campaign against FGM gained momentum and the Task
Force moved with this momentum. Many more organizations joined, looking at the issue from a
human and womenÕs rights perspective. Membership has been on the increase since the Task
ForceÕs formation. Ultimately, members of the Task Force are of the opinion that FGM Òis a form of
violence against women, one of the indicators of gender relations in our society and evidence that
discrimination is an essential characteristic of this relation.Ó236
The FGM Task Force began with three main activities: an advocacy group (working with the
decisionmakers and the media); a grassroots mobilization group; and a research group. The grassroots mobilization group has grown in size and strength under the guidance of Dr. Magdy Helmy.
As a coalition of organizations working in different fields, their strength comes from this variety,
which brings with it a richness of experience. In a state of constant self-renewal, the Task ForceÕs
emphasis is on two of its new projects: a resource center that houses all documents, research, and
media reports on FGM and is open to all researchers; and the forging of links through networking
and strengthening communication with others. Perhaps one of its biggest contributions has been
the development of a new, integrated social approach in dealing with FGM eradication.237 One of
the problems with previous FGM eradication efforts had been that the debates always centered
around medical and religious views.238 The new approach developed by the FGM Task Force draw
upon other aspects of the problem, framing it as a gender and a rights issue.
The passing of legislation regarding FGM is an act with uncertain consequences. The situation
as of the latest ruling (December 1997) is that FGM is banned in all government hospitals and clinics. The exception is in cases in which it is Òneeded.Ó Since FGM is never needed, this clause functions as a loophole and gives the practice some kind of medical legitimacy. Laws that prevent the
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infliction of bodily harm (which in theory includes FGM) in general do already exist. However
legislation that proposes to ban FGM specifically, Òif not supported by a popular movement,
would at best be ineffective and at worst, trigger a backlash that would serve to perpetuate FGM
rather than bring an end to it.Ó239Ultimately, the decision to stop the practice of FGM must come
from the people, and only then can legislation support the decision.
Limitations affecting the strength of the Task Force and its message lie in the attitudes of people
who understand the gravity of FGM but who accept its medicalization (that is, allowing the practice to occur under the supervision of doctors) rather than taking a firm stance against the practice.
To accept medicalization implies an acceptance of the operation but an objection to the circumstances under which it is often performed. These conflicting messages produce Òa lack of clarity
which results in you being unable to communicate solid information to people on a grassroots
level.Ó240 Another drawback faced in the Task ForceÕs work is the lack of easy and accessible literature on the subject of FGM for use in grassroots discussions and with newly literate adults.
A model for action is needed that can be replicated in communities all over Egypt. As always,
human resources and their training comprise a fundamental gap that needs to be filled. However,
because of the FGM Task Force, a forum finally exists that unites the interested factions while simultaneously supporting and mobilizing them. This unity, support, and mobilization are critical if FGM
is to be eliminated. For FGM to become extinct, a change in the social atmosphere needs to occur:
The struggle against FGM is a struggle for the liberation of women and men from the value
system that governs them both. Working toward change of this value system is in fact working
toward changing society as a whole.241
Undoubtedly the Task Force will be a catalyst in this change process
B. OTHER APPROACHES
1. Self-Esteem Project: "I am proud to be a woman!"
While this section has discussed the work of organizations, the following innovative approach
also merits documentation. This is an example of how an organization that offers social services
can streamline gender sensitization and consciousness-raising into its programs. Two weeks
before the United Nations Fourth World Conference on Women, the international NGO CARITAS
organized a workshop in Beijing entitled Young Women Leaders. Taking action, participating in
society, and mobilizing others were among the issues discussed. The United Nations, its machinery, and divisions were also discussed. Sherine Abul Naga, a member of the New Woman
Research Centre, participated. She emerged from this workshop with a decision to mobilize:
I wanted to replicate this idea in Egypt with a few changes to suit the target audience. I
approached CEOSS (Coptic Evangelical Organization for the Social Services) and they invited
thirty Christian and Muslim women from organizations and NGOs between the ages of 20 and
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25 who were either married or single from nine marakiz242 in the Minya governorate in Upper
Egypt to attend this workshop.243
CEOSS proved to be the ideal agent in organizing this workshop for a variety of reasons. CEOSS is
a grassroots development organization that was established in 1950. While its name implies a religious emphasis, in its current work it has addressed the needs of both Christians and Muslims.
CEOSS has worked extensively in community development in almost two dozen communities
within the Minya Governorate. While they target the entire family-men, women, and childrenwomen are especially important to them.
After CEOSS managed the logistics, it was decided that the workshop would be held over a
period of three days with each day divided into two sessions. Abul Naga began the workshop
with a test based on popular psychology, to assess the participantsÕ self-image. Then they talked
about differences between men and women until they arrived at an important question: why do
men beat women?
They all thought that beating a woman was a normal thing because it taught her to behave
properly and not to make mistakes. They all had one reservation: women should not always
get beaten. A woman had to really deserve it, she had to have done something terribly offensive to her brother, father, and husbandÑ(interestingly enough, offenses only to men). By the
end of the workshop, they unanimously agreed that it was not acceptable regardless of the
extent of a womanÕs wrongdoing. After all, when a man does something wrong who punishes
him?244
The women discussed their problems: ÒThey know that they should not be treated in this way but
the options seem limited. Sometimes they have to do things that they donÕt want to.Ó245 When talking about self-esteem, the women expressed feelings of guilt because Òthey have duties they are
not fulfilling and consequently they feel they are not living up to the standards set for them by
society.Ó246
The participants also discussed the media at length. The images of women in the media were
offensive to the workshop participants: ÒThey donÕt feel in anyway represented in the media.Ó247
Abul Naga asked them to evaluate the womenÕs page in the Friday supplement of Al-Ahram (the
main government-run newspaper). The weekÕs recipe was fish in an orange sauce. The women
found it comical and far removed from their realities; for example, the hairstyles were taken out of
a foreign magazine and could only be raplicated with the help of an experienced hairdresser. As a
response to these articles, the women worked in groups to create their own magazines. Theirs contained literature, tips that help them in their daily lives, such as how to recognize food that has
gone bad and articles on womenÕs consciousness. ÒI was impressed, I remember thinking at the
time, that if these women ever did a magazine, it would be really wonderful.Ó248
The women were also told about the history of the Egyptian feminist movement by Nadia
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Abdelwahab and Òwere glad to know that there were women who had struggled in the past.Ó249
The fact that they had never heard of Huda Shaarawi illustrates the gaps in the school curriculum
and the selective nature of mainstream history, a gap that the Women and Memory Forum is
addressing. CEOSS asked Abdelwahab to repeat this lecture to other groups; in most cases, the
group members had no previous knowledge of a womenÕs movement in Egypt.
The women in this workshop were very responsive to the agenda. They bonded and identified
with one another and their problems. Another achievement of this initiative was that these
women spent three consecutive nights away from their homes: ÒThis broke a lot of stereotypes
that I had in my mind: women can leave their homes. I also discovered that Muslim and Christian
women had identical problems.Ó250 Before leaving, each woman was given a sheet of paper to
draw up plans for each quarter of the upcoming year. They all met three months later to share
their achievements. CEOSS followed up and organized more meetings and workshops in which
some of the women still persevere in their path to empowerment.
Ideally, this workshop should be replicated in different settings all over Egypt. As always, however, the lack of funds and human resources is crippling. The housing, food, and transportation
expenses for 30 women were costly for CEOSS, and arranging the logistics was time-consuming.
As Abul NagaÕs results show, however, it was an extremely worthwhile and beneficial experience
for all involved. This endeavour is also important in that it can be easily streamlined into the activities of other organizations, which may not necessarily be womenÕs rights organizations but have a
program addressing women, or providing services for them.
C. PLANNING AHEAD
As noted at the start of this section, the organizations discussed shared a number of concerns and
common trends. Networking, capacity building, accessing the media, forging greater alliances,
and streamlining womenÕs issues into other programs and projects could also be added to the list.
However, there are a few points that we would like to emphasize that became apparent from the
case studies as a whole.
1. Capacity-building
Capacity-building as a need will always exist, but it varies depending on an organizationÕs goals
and the ever-changing reality in which it operates. A vital component of capacity building thus
becomes the need for self-evaluation and renewal. Hala Shukrallah, the director of the
Development Support Centre, advocates coping with these evolving realities through a process of
assessment, Òchange is a planned and scientific process, you need to evaluate yourself and your
surrounding environment to continue to have the best impact.Ó251 Many of the aforementioned
organizations and individuals have been active throughout the 1990s. During this period social,
political, and economic changes have occurred in Egypt, which have affected them and their target groups in different ways. Organizations need to step back, assess these changes, and make the
necessary realignments to better address these new realities.
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2. Reaching Out
An organizationÕs sphere of influence affects its impact. Most organizations do research and advocacy but do not disseminate their findings outside of a specified circle. Sharing information, ideas,
and findings with oneÕs target groups and disseminating to government bodies transforms information into a powerful tool. Generating allies within the government is vital; however, the formation of allies necessitates strength and pressure to counteract the fact that oneÕs agenda may not be
a priority of the government and that common ground may be limited-if there is indeed any at all.
Negotiation skills are vital. Organizations need to recognize the different types of advocacy
that they can employ in negotiating to achieve their goals: talking, disseminating information and
data, and applying pressure, for example, have varied impact. Forging ties within the community
and organizing monitoring structures that place demands on the government are sources of leverage. An organizationÕs strength is often derived from its constituency, in that it is in touch with
peopleÕs needs and can faithfully represent their interests. In this light, the organizationÕs role
becomes that of an intermediary between the people and the government, helping to make its constituentsÕ demands heard.
3. MenÕs Roles
The absence of men from the womenÕs movement needs to be remedied. While this was not an
explicit recommendation voiced by the groups interviewed, we believe it is an implicit one. Men
need to be allies in this struggle and to offer their support on many levels. Involving them could
help in widening the discourse on womenÕs issues, such as FGM and violence against women.
Currently the discourse on these issues places them within the realm of womenÕs problems. They
are not. They are problems for the society as a whole and combating them can only take place successfully with men as active participants in the struggle. Women and men need to work together
to elicit social change for their mutual benefit.
Another dimension of this issue is that men need to be studied (understand their perceptions
and attitudes on certain issues) and addressed (create strategies to target and involve them). If
most of these organizations are interested in gender, then they have failed to address half of their
audience. What is the point of educating a woman about her rights when her father, brother and
husband remain ignorant of all these issues? Men should be involved in awareness-raising sessions that inform women of their rights in, for example, health care, before the law, and as citizens.
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Throughout this monograph, we have seen the variety of discourses and causes through which
the issue of womenÕs rights has been relayed and often subsumed. The fact that women are perceived as the bearers and perpetuators of cultural values and social mores increases the resistance
to any change in their status and the laws that govern their lives. In times of rapid change, ideological failures, economic restructuring, and a sense of lost identity, the burden falls on women to
guarantee the nationÕs cultural authenticity. They are often caught between the state and religious
conservatism. The result is visible in the public discourse on women, which treats them as secondary citizens, and in the impasse reached on some womenÕs issues. An example of this is the
nationality law. A great deal of lobbying has been done around this issue; yet it seems that resistance from government factions is much stronger. Ultimately, being caught between the currents
of religious conservatism and state ambiguity means one of two things: either womenÕs concerns
are deprioritized and sacrificed in favour of other Ômore importantÕ issues; or compromises are
made at their expense. These factors will undermine the rights women gained during this century
and stand in the way of achieving their remaining goals.
Women will continue to be divided over the definition of their gender interests, over the nature
of social arrangements which best serve them and over their visions of a better society. It is
important to remember that their various movements are responses to similar sets of contradictions and that their discourses are circumscribed by the political cultures of their societies.
Ultimately feminist movements in Muslim societies, as elsewhere, will take their place alongside the social forces struggling for civil and democratic rights in their respective countries.252
Today, unrealistic hopes for progress are tempered by the bitter trail of broken promises.
WomenÕs demands must stand on their own, not under a larger umbrella. WomenÕs organizations
are faced with the challenge of amplifying womenÕs voices, to articulate and relay their own deficient realities and attempt to create better ones. A movement that demands rights for the purpose
of realizing equality and liberation for women and men will eventually triumph. We will be heard.
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